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**CAMERON HOUSTON
& ÁRON KECSKÉS**

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Preface

Re-launched in 2013, the St Andrews Historical Journal is a student-run biannual academic journal which showcases some of the best work produced by students at the University of St Andrews and other institutions across the United Kingdom and abroad. Our aim is to foster an appreciation for independent research whilst also affording students an opportunity to engage critically with historical questions beyond the confines of university curricula.

The current edition centres on the theme of ‘Historical Manifestations of Contemporary Discourses’. Contributors were invited to examine past occurrences of historical themes relevant in contemporary discourses. Our writers, who range from undergraduates to graduate students, have written on an array of topics spanning the medieval and modern worlds. Their contributions have been organised thematically. Part I addresses historical manifestations of discourses concerning immigration and identity; part II, abortion and gender; and part III, climate change and environmentalism.

Acknowledgments are due to the members of the History Society committee for their advice and guidance and the School of History for their generous financial support. We would also like to thank the contributors themselves for their diligence and dedication over the past few months.

Historically yours,

Cameron Houston & Áron Kecskés

Editors-in-Chief

Contributors & Editorial Board

Contributors

Fiona Banham is beginning an MLitt in Environmental History at the University of St Andrews in September 2019. Her historical interests lie predominantly in late modern Central and Eastern Europe. She is particularly captivated by the interrelationship between human culture, politics and ideologies and the physical environment.

Luke Campopiano is in fourth-year undergraduate, studying History and Philosophy at the University of St Andrews. His research interests include intellectual history, sovereignty in international law, and the Arctic. He hopes to pursue a career in Arctic policy.

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Editors

Cameron Houston is a PhD candidate in Medieval History at the University of St Andrews. Cameron graduated with an MA (Hons) in Medieval History from the University of St Andrews in 2017 and an MSt in Medieval History from University College, Oxford in 2019. His research, funded by the Arts & Humanities Research Council via the Scottish Graduate School for Arts & Humanities, focuses on discourses of power, identity, and space in Lotharingia. He has interests in early medieval political and cultural history, especially Francia.

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Part I: Immigration & Identity

‘Like Wolves into the Fold’: *De Excidio Britanniae* and Immigration in the Anglo-Saxon *Adventus*¹

Trevor Wiley

Then a pack of cubs burst forth from the lair of the barbarian lioness... the winds were favourable; favourable too the omens and the auguries, which prophesied... that they would live for three hundred years in the land towards their prowes were directed, and that for half the time... they would repeatedly lay it waste.²

So the sixth-century British monk Gildas describes the initial arrival of the Anglo-Saxons into the British Isles only a century earlier. His language is strong, but perhaps not unduly so: Gildas lived in a period defined by the Saxon expansion across Britain, and his apocalyptically-toned polemic *De Excidio et Conquestu Britanniae* remains the historian's only contemporary written source for the event, lending a general air of gloom and hopelessness to a period already filled with unexplained questions and uncertain hypotheses. While *De Excidio* essentially remains more of an attack on his sinful British contemporaries, framed as a 'repent-or-die' narrative Gildas' treatment of the Anglo-Saxons as a punishing plague of biblical proportions highlights important elements of the early medieval concepts of immigration and ethnicity, and can provide a window into a period of history often defined in terms of 'barbarian migration'.

A Word on Terminology

Late antique and early medieval Britain saw a wide variety of ethnic groups dominate the political landscape, each of whom often bear a wide assortment of names and identifiers in modern scholarship. In order to keep terminology readily straightforward in a short article, several broad terms have been used for these varied groups. The terms 'Saxon' and 'Anglo-

¹ Gildas, *The Ruin of Britain and Other Works* ed. Michael Winterbottom (Chichester, 2002), p. 26.

² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

Saxon' are used interchangeably here to refer to the variety of Germanic populations which dominated England in the second half of the first millennium; these populations likely grew from a diverse milieu including Angles, Saxons, Jutes, and smaller groups, such as the Frisians.

Likewise, the terms 'Briton' and 'British', largely used in the modern day to refer to inhabitants of the United Kingdom in general, are used in this essay in the specific context of the pre-Saxon native Celtic population of the singular isle of Britain. It is a simple term which generically covers a wide variety of likely independent and diverse polities stretching from the Firth of Forth (and possibly beyond) down to the tip of Cornwall, but one which allows a broad look at the period's political climate.

It is also worth mentioning that Gildas himself often used these terms when describing the two groups: his Latin utilises the terms *Britanni* and *Saxones*, glossing over many of the distinctions which separated both groups in order to create a smooth narrative.³ It is to this narrative that we now turn.⁴

Contexts and Historiography

In order to put Gildas' words into context, we must look back to the end of the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth, decades before the arrival of the Saxons, when the power of the Western Roman Empire was waning in the distant provinces of Britain. *De Excidio* presents a broad narrative of the period, whose basic structure seems to remain uncontested on the whole in modern scholarship: late Roman Britain was dominated by civil revolt, and with the departure of the self-declared Emperor Constantine III to the Continent at the beginning of the fifth century, the island's Roman military population essentially vanished.⁵ Faced with renewed assaults from their northern neighbors, recorded as the Picts of Caledonia and the Scots of Dál Riata, the Romano-Britons supposedly made a final plea to their former occupiers, begging the Roman consul Aëtius for help, for 'the barbarians push us back to the sea, the sea pushes us back to the barbarians; between these two kinds of death, we are either drowned or

³ Theodor Mommsen and Johannes Lucas, *Chronica Minora Saec. IV. V. VI. VII*, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, T. 9, 11, 13 (Berlin, 1882), pp. 30, 38.

⁴ For further reading of Gildas' *De Excidio* in Latin, see Mommsen and Lucas, *Ibid.* For the most widely-used English translation, see Gildas, *Ruin of Britain*.

⁵ For a general look at the conquest which follows Gildas' structures, see N. J. Higham, *The English Conquest: Gildas and Britain in the Fifth Century* (Manchester, 1994). It is worth noting that some smaller elements of Gildas' narrative have been argued over at length: his chronology is certainly inaccurate, as are his attributions in several cases. For a good introduction to Gildas' other pitfalls, see Michael Lapidge and David N. Dumville (ed.), *Gildas: New Approaches* (Woodbridge, 1984).

slaughtered.’⁶ Gildas briskly describes the aftermath: no answer was received, and in an attempt to stem the attacks, the monk writes that the leaders of the British sought Anglo-Saxon mercenaries from overseas, settling them in Britain in return for military service, a practice not inconsistent with contemporary Continental Roman *foederati* models.⁷ What followed, Gildas tells us, was simple revolt: when the Britons were unable to provide the increased supplies the Anglo-Saxons demanded, the mercenaries rose up against their former employers and began their conquest of the isle.

Even the most casual reader of this basic account, however, will notice that our framework has a critical flaw: it largely depends on a single textual source, *De Excidio*, to provide the framework and substance of large sections of the narrative. Gildas’ writings provide the only known contemporary work on the subject, aside from short Continental references, and it vastly influenced later writing on the same subject.⁸ This makes it nearly impossible to independently validate much of his narrative.

The lack of alternative sources is compounded onto the issue of Gildas’ motivations for writing his work: *De Excidio* does not purport to be a history or documenting of events at all. Instead, Gildas’ work functions as a biblical polemic, warning sinners about the consequences of their actions, and frames the characters of the narrative in religious terms. This emphasis on telling a compelling biblically-structured narrative naturally leads to questions about how much we can trust Gildas. We must, therefore, approach the study of *De Excidio* with a terrifying premise: we must work with a source we can barely validate textually, and which we cannot trust to give an accurate account.

⁶ Gildas, *Ruin of Britain*, pp. 23-4.

⁷ *Foederati* (from *foedus* or ‘treaty’) systems were common during the decline of Roman power on the Continent; on *foederati* in the context of Roman decline, see Walter Pohl (ed.), *Kingdoms of the Empire: The Integration of Barbarians in Late Antiquity* (Leiden, 1997), a collection of essays including excellent investigation of the system in the fourth-sixth centuries, and Walter Goffart, ‘The Technique of Barbarian Settlement in the Fifth Century: A Personal, Streamlined Account with Ten Additional Comments’, *Journal of Late Antiquity*, 3.1 (2010), pp. 65-98, which offers a summary of his work on the subject.

⁸ The most notable writer to follow in Gildas’ footsteps is Bede, who likely wrote his *Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum* just under two centuries after *De Excidio*. While Bede’s account is fuller and professes to have a variety of sources, his influence from Gildas’ account is undeniable, and he mentions the British monk (although sparingly).

Immigration: Weighted Language

The Oxford English Dictionary defines immigration, somewhat nebulously, as ‘the action of coming to live permanently in a foreign country’.⁹ Borrowed into English from the Latin verb *immigrare*, ‘to remove or to change abode’, immigration is a concept so wrapped up in modern contexts that it can be difficult for the modern reader to separate the images on the daily news from its usage in analysing historical population movements.¹⁰ Given the charged nature of the term, it is a common and understandable response to avoid the word in discussions of the period, lest it invite some dangerously anachronistic modern comparisons.

The limitation of any modern reader is having to approach the past through our own expectations, language, and culture; and as such, historical narratives of movement, conquest, and settlement draw seemingly natural comparisons to modern equivalents. This means that while the historian may hope to set some of their biases at the door and carefully select terminology with as little baggage as possible, we must also be prepared to address the period with modern concepts and draw clear lines between what is shared and what is fundamentally conceptually different.

Saxon *Foederati*

Does the Saxon *adventus* lend itself to the definition of immigration? The original impetus for the settling of Saxons in Britain certainly fits naturally into accepted contemporary Roman models used on the Continent, strengthening our confidence in that narrative. The *foederati* model, so named after the specific Latin word for ‘treaty’ used in accounts, saw ethnic groups from outside the Roman Empire’s control settled at their borders from the fourth century onward, providing protection in return for money and supply from the Romans. While this system has been extensively treated in the case of groups such as the Goths in a Continental context, the lack of evidence for the British Isles has served as a barrier to study of the Insular settlement of Saxons in this framework.

However limited our source material, it is clear that Gildas was thinking of the Anglo-Saxons in *foederati* terms, as his rare references to the treaty signed between the Saxons and

⁹ Oxford English Dictionary, *Immigration* <<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/immigration>> [accessed April 18, 2019].

¹⁰ Charles Short and Charlton T. Lewis (ed.) *A Latin Dictionary* (London, 1879), ‘immigro’, p. 892.

the Britons used the distinctive term *foedus*, signifying that at least to our British author, the initial settlement was one which fit recognized models of the time.¹¹ Gildas' writing in Latin and his emphasis on the Romans as a protective force for the Britons certainly seems to indicate that at least for our monk, the Britons represented some form of continuity from their Roman past. While it is notable that this system was being employed by a people who were seemingly largely opposed and downright rebellious towards systems of Roman authority, Gildas compounds on the transactional nature of the relationship with descriptions of Saxon complaints about their 'monthly allowance' of supplies.¹² We can thus view the Saxons as likely being invited in for seemingly permanent settlement and supply in return for military service against the Britons' northern enemies. Gildas tells us that this would result in permanent settlements in Kent and a peaceful opening to the *adventus*, however briefly.¹³ There is no indication within the text that this was intended as a temporary arrangement; the Saxons had come to stay, marking a permanent 'change of abode'. This invites the modern reader to compare this *adventus* to concepts and images of modern immigration.

Apocalyptic and Cultural Contexts

While the immediate comparison to modern situations is tempting, it is also important to place Gildas' *adventus* in contemporary cultural contexts which greatly complicate any comparison. *De Excidio* itself was not written within a cultural vacuum: the text's narrative of the *adventus* is crossed by two distinct contextual layers which colour its discursive framework. The first is Gildas' depiction of the Saxons as a divinely-sent extension of God's will in apocalyptic terms, while the second is the unique relationship which the *foederati* system represents, which places the Saxons in a transactional migratory status which has no real modern equivalent. A nuanced understanding of *De Excidio* and the *adventus* can be reached by understanding these layers.

Although Gildas' religious narrative has been mentioned in brief before, his depiction of the Saxons in particular is one which defies simple comparison to modern attitudes and depictions of immigration. While Gildas' hostility towards the Saxons is plain in his comparisons to wild beasts and lionesses, *De Excidio* goes beyond this to depict the Saxons in

¹¹ Mommsen and Lucas, *Chronica Minora*, p. 39.

¹² Gildas, *The Ruin of Britain*, pp. 26.

¹³ It is worth noting that the supposed first Saxon settlement in Kent was far from Gildas' perceived threats of both Scots and Picts, an interesting discrepancy in traditional understanding of *foederati* settled on borders.

terms of a larger divine punishment, a depiction actually picked up and built upon by later Anglo-Saxon writers such as Bede. This interpretation of the Saxons as a divine tool rather than an autonomous people is central to Gildas' narrative, and one which must be acknowledged as a narrative largely alien to modern immigration dialogues.

De Excidio's biblical focus on the Saxons is apparent from their first mention, which is accompanied by an Old Testament quotation from the Book of Isaiah, which sets the tone for the following passages relating the first wave of Saxon attacks on the Britons.¹⁴ The attacks of the Saxons are subsequently framed as 'just punishment' and Gildas begins his heavy-handed comparisons to biblical stories of God's righteous fury by beginning with the Saxon assaults:

in this assault, comparable with that of the Assyrians of old on Judaea, there was fulfilled according to history for us also what the prophet said in his lament: 'They have burned with fire your sanctuary on the ground, they have polluted the dwelling-place of your name.'¹⁵

Gildas' comparison with the Assyrians marks his Saxons as fulfilling the same role in the narrative of *De Excidio* as that of those Old Testament conquerors: chosen pagans, selected to visit holy retribution on unfaithful Israelites. This narrative of the Saxons as God's chosen punishment, regardless of their paganism, is strong enough to reach Bede centuries later: despite being a Christian Saxon monk, Bede refers to the conquest of the Britons by his forefathers as 'ordained by God as a punishment on their [the Britons'] wickedness' and calls the non-Christian Saxons retrospectively 'the people whom he [God] had chosen'.¹⁶ This emphasis on the Saxons as a divine weapon rather than as immigrants makes *De Excidio* difficult to use as a source for examining the *adventus* in migratory terms.

Conclusions

Gildas' *De Excidio Britanniae* sits at a frustrating crux of early medieval British history, serving as both the primary contemporary textual source for the Saxon *adventus* and as a text which defies straightforward reading and analysis due to the multiple layers of religious

¹⁴ Gildas, *The Ruin of Britain*, p. 26: "Foolish princes of Zoan," as has been said, 'giving unwise counsel to Pharoah'".

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 27

¹⁶ Bede, *Ecclesiastical History of the English People: With Bede's Letter to Egbert* ed. and trans. by Leo Sherley-Price, R.E. Latham, and D.H. Farmer (St. Ives, 1990), pp. 62, 72.

imagery and polemic language which its author employs. This paradoxical source sits alongside the contradictory nature of the term 'immigration' in the period, which wholly fails to capture the unique nature of the *adventus's foederati* system. It is, therefore, important for any student of the period to take great care in, if not outright reject, drawing comparisons between the *adventus* as presented by our lone contemporary source, weighted with religious imagery and Biblical parallel, with modern narratives or models of immigration.

Excluded No More: World War II and the Formation of a Chinese-American Identity

Grant Wong

To the men of our generation, World War II was the most important historical event of our times. For the first time, we felt we could make it in American society.

Charlie Leong, journalist¹

Years before Nazi Germany's invasion of Poland in 1939, the Second World War had already begun. As the future Allied Powers in the West looked on in concern as Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, and Austria were swallowed up by the rising Axis powers of Germany and Italy, the Empire of Japan had already begun a war of conquest in the East. Japan, in its quest for political and military dominance of East Asia had begun to expand into China, claiming its northeastern provinces of Manchuria in 1931. With 1937 came the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, a skirmish between Chinese and Japanese soldiers that marked the formal beginnings of the Second-Sino Japanese War.

Chinese living in the United States looked on with horror as the Japanese took Shanghai and Nanjing, brutally pushing Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces further and further into China's interior.² The peril faced by their native land served as a call to action for Chinese in America, who supported the war effort from overseas. Once the United States entered the war, they also came to support the fight of their adopted homeland, whether by working in its factories, fighting in its armed forces, or engaging in other forms of civic participation. The Second World War provided Chinese living in the US with unprecedented opportunities to engage with American society more widely and utilise China's position as the US' wartime ally to make political and social gains. This allowed them to become increasingly accepted as Americans. Though Chinese in America did not go through this process without facing anti-Asian prejudice and racism, this paper argues that the Second World War represented a crucial turning point in Chinese-American history. Jingyi Song argues that through their involvement in World War II, Chinese-American soldiers fought 'both against imperial expansion and for

¹ Charlie Leong as quoted in Iris Chang, *The Chinese in America*, (New York, 2003) p. 227.

² *Ibid.*, p. 214-16. The Nationalist Party, or *Guomindang*, led the Republic of China during World War II. The Republic of China (which preceded the communist People's Republic) represented Japan's foremost opposition in the Second-Sino Japanese War.

democracy’.³ This sense of fighting both for China and the US echoed throughout the greater Chinese community living in the United States, creating a new dual identity in the process. Through their involvement in the Second World War, Chinese living in America were politically and socially made into Chinese-Americans. Today, crucial questions of national identity and national belonging are being asked across the globe. For instance, what does it mean to be American? By considering the collective wartime experience of Chinese America, I seek to provide a historical perspective that can inform such contemporary questions.

At the time of the outbreak of World War II in Asia, certain characteristics of the Chinese-American community would come to influence the development of their history over the course of the war.⁴ Most striking was its separation from the rest of American society. Held back from job opportunities and higher education due to racism and discrimination, most Chinese in America were restricted to their ethnic enclaves in Chinatowns across the country.⁵ Chinese-Americans were also alienated legally: the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed in 1882 and was still in effect at the beginning of the war, which banned the immigration of all Chinese laborers for 10 years (the definition of ‘laborers’ and the 10-year ban were expanded in subsequent legislation) and prevented foreign-born Chinese from becoming American citizens.⁶ Also significant was the character of America’s Chinese-American population: many Chinese living in the US at the time were American-born or had lived the majority of their lives in the US. While many may have been pessimistic about their chances in American society due to limiting factors of racism and prejudice, they generally saw the stake of their futures in the US rather than in China as previous generations had. This generation also identified more strongly with American society than their ancestral homeland; those born in the US were American citizens by birthright.⁷ By 1940, a few years into the war, the percentage of American-born Chinese would pass the number of foreign-born Chinese for the first time.⁸ As stated by K. Scott Wong:

³ Jinyi Song, ‘Fighting for Chinese American Identity’, *New York History* 83.4 (2002), p. 393.

⁴ While this paper argues that Chinese-Americans were ‘made’ as a dual-identity, I will use the term ‘Chinese-American’ as shorthand to refer to Chinese living in the United States as well.

⁵ Ellen Dionne Wu, ‘Race and Asian-American Citizenship’, (PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2006) pp. 46-7.

⁶ K. Scott Wong, *Americans First: Chinese Americans and the Second World War* (Cambridge, 2005) p. 8.

⁷ Gloria Chun, *Of Orphans and Warriors: Inventing Chinese American Culture and Identity* (New Brunswick, 2000) p. 43. Wong, *Americans First*, p. 33

⁸ Chang, *The Chinese in America*, p. 221.

the war would offer some of them a chance finally to become Americans, both legally and emotionally. It gave them opportunities to demonstrate both their patriotism for the United States and their heartfelt Chinese nationalism.⁹

The Home Front: Exploring America Beyond Chinatown

The drive to defend their native land against imperial expansion mobilised Chinese-Americans across the US to political advocacy, leading many to venture beyond the Chinatowns they had been previously restricted to. Political organisation and activism on behalf of China's defence prompted large-scale demonstrations that gave Chinese-Americans greater prominence throughout the US. Additionally, America's crucial labor shortage during the war years opened up new job opportunities for Chinese-Americans that were denied to them before the war on the bases of prejudice and racism. In both cases, Chinese-Americans came to experience the US beyond their confined ethnic enclaves, engaging extensively with non-Chinese America for the first time.

Mass Chinese-American community organisation largely began in the depths of the Great Depression, as Chinatowns' traditional ethnic organizations and elites were unable to support those who had lost their jobs and businesses. New groups formed in response to the needs of their communities, ranging from political advocacy groups to labor unions.¹⁰ These developments would set the stage for Chinese-American civic involvement during the war. On May 9th, 1938, a parade of 12,000 Chinese-Americans from across the East Coast organized in New York City for 'Solidarity Day', an event intended to raise awareness of Japanese aggression in the East. Held on the 23rd anniversary of the issuing of Japan's Twenty-One Demands, a set of imperialist demands that the power had placed on China, participants marched for three and a half miles through Chinatown and Lower Manhattan.¹¹ The parade's spectacle included a traditional lion dance performed by 200 costumed children, six airplanes flown overhead by Chinese-Americans eager to soon fly as part of the war effort in Asia, and the presentation of a scroll to Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia.¹² A 45-by-75 foot flag of Nationalist China was also part of the parade proceedings, showered by coins by spectators wishing to contribute to the war effort. The flag came to be flown across the country for other parades,

⁹ Wong, *Americans First*, p. 44.

¹⁰ Song, "Fighting for Chinese American Identity," pp. 387-389.

¹¹ Wong, *Americans First*, p. 36.

¹² New York Times, 'Chinatown Fete Today', *New York Times*, May 9, 1938, p 17.

used again and again in demonstrations supporting the war effort, weighed down by the donations of onlookers.¹³

Just six months later, on the other side of the country, another Chinese-American demonstration was to take place. A Greek freighter docked at San Francisco Bay, the *S.S. Spyros*, was to ship scrap iron and other war material to Japan. As the United States had not yet entered the war, it continued to trade with Japan, and thus indirectly contributed to the ongoing conquest of China.¹⁴ Largely by word-of-mouth, the local Chinese-American community began a picketing line protesting the shipment and preventing the *Spyros* from leaving. 200 Chinese-Americans were soon ‘met by [European] Americans, Greeks, Jews, and other volunteers of many nationalities, 300 in number’, and the protest only grew from there until reaching roughly 8,000 people in total.¹⁵ Chinese America, called upon by the plight of its native China, came to engage with Americans of other ethnic groups through protest. The demonstrators made a strong case against trade with Japan that could not have been ignored, standing strong even as rain caused the red ink from their posters to drip down onto their faces.¹⁶ The protest was a compelling one, but more importantly, it was successful. The full membership of the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) resolved to respect the picket lines, followed by a new development as described by the *Chinese Daily*:

Mr. Henry Smith, spokesperson for the longshoremen, told the Chinese representatives that the C.I.O. Council had passed a resolution to instruct the secretary to call all labor, fraternal, civic, and religious organizations for a Coastwide conference to study and promote the embargo of all materials to Japan.¹⁷

Chinese America had made its voice heard. The picket line ended, with its protestors leaving in a mile-long parade back to Chinatown, all the while singing ‘March of the Volunteers’. a wartime song of Chinese resistance.¹⁸ This article only presents here two high-profile cases of Chinese-American activism, but stresses that these two, combined with countless other protests and meetings across the country, did much to bring Chinese-Americans into the public eye and

¹³ Wong, *Americans First*, p. 37.

¹⁴ Lim P. Lee, ‘Chinatown Goes Picketing’, *Chinese Digest*, January, 1939, pp. 10-11.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11. Chang, *The Chinese in America*, pp. 218-219.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

¹⁷ Lee, ‘Chinatown Goes Picketing’, p. 10.

¹⁸ Wong, *Americans First*, 42. Coincidentally, ‘March of the Volunteers’ is the current national anthem of the People’s Republic of China today.

into greater American political discourse. Chinese America's separation from the rest of the US was coming to a close.

On December 8th, 1941, the United States formally entered the war against Japan following the Axis power's surprise attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor. Faced with a dire need for laborers, wartime industries loosened their hiring restrictions, opening up job opportunities to thousands of Chinese-Americans who had previously been unable to take them on account of their race. Shipyards in Richmond announced they would hire Chinese-Americans regardless of citizenship status or English-speaking skills.¹⁹ Restaurant unions in Portland, Oregon decided to allow Chinese-Americans to join them.²⁰ These new employments of Chinese-American workers would ultimately have a long-term impact, guaranteeing a spot in the labor market for the demographic for years to come.²¹ While plenty of Chinese-American men entered wartime work to their great benefit, wartime employment was especially uplifting for Chinese-American women.

Employment in defence work allowed Chinese-American women the freedom to escape the confines of the household and its duties. Prewar jobs were already difficult enough to find without the additional burdens of domestic work and childcare, and higher education was prioritised by parents more often for sons than for daughters.²² The employment of Chinese-American women in new occupations across the country allowed them to venture beyond their limited social circles and engage with wider American society. The spirit of Rosie the Riveter was embodied in Chinese-American women ranging from Ah Yoke Gee, who worked alongside her daughters in the shipyard, to Jade Snow Wong, who was given the honor of christening a new Liberty ship for writing an award-winning essay.²³ These new opportunities were not devoid of prejudice, however, as better jobs typically went to Caucasian women.²⁴ Still, wartime employment represented a tremendous success for the Chinese-American community in securing it a spot in the US' economy and in its greater multicultural society.

¹⁹ Xiaojian Zhao, 'Chinese American Women Defense Workers in World War II', *California History* 75.2 (1996), p. 140.

²⁰ Wu, 'Race and Asian-American Citizenship', p. 47.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

²² Zhao, 'Chinese American Women Defense Workers in World War II', pp. 144, 146.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 149. Rosie the Riveter was a cultural icon of World War II America, a representation of the nation's female defence workers. Her most iconic image comes from a poster depicting a female defense worker wearing a red bandana and a blue jacket, exclaiming "We Can Do It!" while rolling up a sleeve, showing off her bicep.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

China as Wartime Ally: Chinese-American Military Service and the Repeal of Exclusion

As the United States entered World War II, it quickly became apparent that its historical anti-Chinese attitudes would be counterproductive to the war effort. Now China was an important political and strategic ally. To continue to tolerate anti-Chinese attitudes and practices would play right into the rhetoric of Imperial Japanese propaganda, which denounced the West's anti-Asian racism and idealized an 'Asia for the Asiatics'.²⁵ The American public's image of Chinese-Americans came to be greatly improved with positive attention from the press, as US Army pamphlets described Chinese people as 'naturally democratic' and 'in many ways more 'civilized' than [Americans] are'.²⁶ Unfortunately, in some cases this improvement of the Chinese image came at the cost of anti-Japanese racism. One article in *Life* magazine was written with the purpose of helping readers 'distinguish friendly Chinese from enemy alien Japs'.²⁷ While still informed by racial stereotyping, such publications did much to improve American society's image of people of Chinese descent. Chinese-Americans were able to take full advantage of this new, pro-Chinese outlook, further improving their community's image and shaping Chinese-American identity through serving in the US Armed Forces and lobbying to repeal the hated Chinese Exclusion Act.²⁸

Given the opportunity to prove their loyalty to the United States and defend their native land from imperial aggression, Chinese-Americans enthusiastically joined the US Armed Forces in great numbers. As recounted by sociologist Rose Hum Lee, 'New York's Chinatown cheered itself hoarse when the first draft numbers were drawn by Chinese-Americans'.²⁹ It is estimated that nearly 12,000-15,000 Chinese-American men served in the military during World War II, almost twenty percent of the community's adult male population.³⁰ Chinese-American military service continued the war's trend of increased Chinese-American interaction, as soldiers often served in integrated units, unlike Japanese Americans and African Americans. As put by Iris Chang, 'some had never before befriended men of a different race,

²⁵ Xiaohua Ma, 'The Sino-American Alliance During World War II and the Lifting of the Chinese Exclusion Acts', *American Studies International* 38.2 (2000), pp. 42-4.

²⁶ Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore, *EM 42: Our Chinese Ally* (Washington DC, 1944) <[https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/em-42-our-chinese-ally-\(1944\)/who-are-the-chinese](https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/em-42-our-chinese-ally-(1944)/who-are-the-chinese)>.

²⁷ Life Magazine, 'How to Tell Japs from the Chinese', *Life*, December 22 1941, pp. 81-2

²⁸ Wong, *Americans First*, pp. 43-44, 58-70. Ma, 'The Sino-American Alliance', pp. 46-59.

²⁹ Rose Hum Lee as quoted in Wong, *Americans First*, 59.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 58.

much less slept and showered next to them'.³¹ While Chinese-American soldiers still faced incidents of racism and prejudice in the armed forces, their cross-cultural interactions and military service would make them more American than ever before.

The war represented a turning point for its Chinese-American soldiers, as fighting in the conflict led them to increasingly identify as Americans rather than as Chinese cultural others. Soldiers recognized their Chinese roots while firmly investing their futures and hopes into the United States, forming a sense of dual identity in the fires of combat.³² Individual conceptions of identity were highly varied and nuanced, but had a sense of being both Chinese and American. Take the account of Eddie Fung, who fought in the Philippines and survived years in a Japanese POW camp:

I've never considered myself to be Chinese. My feeling has always been that I am a human being first. I just happen to be of Chinese extraction, and I just happen to be an American because I was born in the US.³³

Soldier David Gan joined the war out of a great sense of American patriotism: 'I had never felt so happy and proud that I was an American, ready to fight for my country even if it meant that I must give up my life'.³⁴ Such ideas of dual identity were even depicted in the American press, strikingly so in a cover piece by *Life* magazine about Chinese-American pilots:

[They are] more attentive in the classroom than any other nationality... But life has not been all study for the Chinese cadets. They are as fun-loving and mischievous as any American youths.³⁵

In fighting for the United States, Chinese-American soldiers created their own sense of dual identity, as citizen-soldiers who embodied American ideals and defended the land of their ancestors.

The wartime Sino-American alliance also presented an incontestable case for the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, which had been in effect since 1882. The first American

³¹ Chang, *The Chinese in America*, pp. 229-230.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 227-230. Wong, *Americans First*, pp. 58-70.

³³ Eddie Fung, *The Adventures of Eddie Fung* (Seattle, 2007) p. 200.

³⁴ David Gan as quoted in Chang, *The Chinese in America*, p. 229.

³⁵ *Life* Magazine, as quoted in Wong, *Americans First*, pp. 61-2.

immigration law to be drafted along racial lines, it represented a major symbolic barrier to Chinese who wished to become Chinese-American legally as well as emotionally.³⁶ Emboldened by their cause being one of racial justice, Chinese-Americans and their Caucasian allies heavily lobbied for the law's repeal. The largely white 'Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion and Place Immigration on A Quota Basis' was particularly influential, headed by pro-China intellectuals such as author Pearl Buck and Henry Luce, founder of *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune*.³⁷ Supported by political and cultural notables, Chinese-American activists used measured, effective rhetoric in their campaign to repeal the act. They were not necessarily asking for rights greater than those of other American demographics, but advocated for being put on a quota system, a system which would still only allow about 107 Chinese to enter the country each year.³⁸ Noting the opposition of labor organisations to the repeal based upon racialized fears of a Chinese influx of labor, journalist Gilbert Woo quipped:

They say that once the 107 of you manly fellows arrive, you will compete with the tens of millions of Americans for bread and thus drive down the living standards of the United States and cheapen the labor force. Do you really have such power?³⁹

Ultimately, with the support of President Franklin Roosevelt and a crucial diplomatic appeal from Soong Mei-ling, China's First Lady, the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed on December 17, 1943.⁴⁰ Chinese-Americans were thus validated as true Americans, through and through.

Conclusions

Charlie Leong could not have been more correct in his description of the Second World War as 'the most important historical event of our times'.⁴¹ For Chinese living in the US, the war represented a chance for them to actively define themselves as Americans. From San Francisco to New York City, they embodied American values of democracy through civic organisation and political protest. In taking up jobs on the home front, they became integral parts of the American economy, supporting the defense of their native land. They served as citizen-soldiers, as loyal American sons in Europe and Asia, and repealed their hated Exclusion

³⁶ Wong, *Americans First*, p. 8.

³⁷ Ma, 'The Sino-American Alliance', p. 51.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

³⁹ Gilbert Woo, 'One Hundred and Seven Chinese', *Chinese Times*, September 7 1943 trans. Ellen Yeung.

⁴⁰ Song, 'Fighting for Chinese American Identity', pp. 399-401.

⁴¹ Charlie Leong as quoted in Chang, *The Chinese in America*, p. 227.

Act through due political process. While Chinese living in America would face setbacks during the Cold War with China's turn to communism, they would still maintain the important gains they had made during the Second World War.⁴² In 2018, the Chinese-American World War II Congressional Gold Medal Act was passed unanimously through both houses of Congress, and signed into law. Formally recognizing the wartime contributions of Chinese-American veterans, its passage proves that the legacy of World War II Chinese America lives on.⁴³ When we ask ourselves today what it means to be American, we must look back to the past. Through the trials of the Second World War, Chinese-Americans were not born, but made; in fighting in the name of homes new and old, they defiantly declared themselves American, and would be excluded no more.

⁴² Wu, 'Race and Asian-American Citizenship', pp. 41-2.

⁴³ Erica Y. King and Elizabeth Thomas, *5 Chinese-American veterans awarded the Congressional Gold Medal*, 29 January 2019, <<https://abcnews.go.com/ABCNews/chinese-american-veterans-awarded-congressional-gold-medal/story?id=60707422>>.

Part II: Abortion & Gender

A Woman's Choice: Abortion, 'Women's Health' and Bodily Autonomy in Medieval Europe

Ruth McKechnie

Recent years have seen a resurgence in debates surrounding abortion and its ethical connotations. Following Ireland's 2018 referendum upon the 8th Amendment – the legislation upholding the country's strict abortion laws – the relevancy of women's health and bodily autonomy is once more at the forefront of politics. Both the supporting and opposing campaigns for the repeal of the 8th Amendment have used historical precedents to argue their causes, citing examples of the perceived benefits and detriments of terminating a pregnancy.¹ Abortion is a topic widely mentioned within historical discourse but never fully investigated. It is assumed by many historians that, like the values of today, abortion in the past was a complete cultural taboo. Condemnation of these practices can be seen throughout history and across Europe.

This paper will not only investigate the backlash and social stigma associated with abortion but also its wider role in medieval society and its relation to further discussions of women's health in the Middle Ages. It will demonstrate how medieval stances towards abortion and women's health were largely progressive in contrast to popular notions on the subject. This reiterates that modern discussions of abortion and debates surrounding it are continuations of a discourse going back to the Middle Ages. It considers the significance and continued impact of the history of abortion in the West, with particular focus on Ireland, where its practice has been exceptionally contentious. By looking at the *Lives* of saints, penitentials and witchcraft trials, a more nuanced picture of this practice is presented, one that is beyond our conventional view of how abortion has been historically perceived. This paper will examine historical memory and the way modern attitudes have developed, as well as how they have impacted the image of abortion in the past. Furthermore, it will outline how these texts fit into modern

¹ Joel Gunter, 'Abortion in Ireland: The Fight for Choice' (March 2017), <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39183423> [accessed March 2019]

discussions of women's right to choose and exercise autonomy over their own bodies. It will show the necessity of continued study of historical women as the challenges they faced often paralleled those faced by contemporaries.

The 8th Amendment and its Significance

The 8th Amendment to the Constitution of Ireland was introduced in 1983 after a countrywide referendum and effectively prohibited all terminations of pregnancy. It equated the life of the mother with that of her unborn child and only permitted abortion in the case of significant risk to the mother's life.² This meant that Irish women had to travel to the UK in order to receive an abortion, and over 200,000 women have done so since this legislation was implemented.³ Those seeking to protect the 8th Amendment often cite the religious and cultural precedence of a predominantly Roman Catholic Ireland for the continued prohibition of abortion, harkening back to the earliest church scholars as justification.⁴ This assertion does not, however, reflect the true context of this apparently continuous prevention of pregnancy termination, as the deeper study of the source material – hagiographies, folk stories, and criminal cases – yields a somewhat different story. The same is true for most discussions of abortion across Europe and the seemingly universal condemnation it has been subject to throughout history. It is right to say that abortion is prohibited in Christian doctrine, but this is not the fact that is under dispute. It is the severity with which the act of abortion was treated within medieval society and the misconceptions that have arisen surrounding it that provide a source of debate. Indeed, as later discussed, there are examples of abortion having been permitted in the Middle Ages. Abortion was only banned in Ireland in 1861 and excommunication was instituted from the Catholic Church in 1917, arguably due to a large-scale reimagining within ecclesiastical circles on what it meant to kill as a result of the First World War.⁵ The process of redefining the Church's stance on abortion was to continue throughout the twentieth century into what today are the accepted measures against it. This begs the question of the extent to which we can place modern ideas about abortion onto past social precedents.

² Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1983.

³ Ammar Kamila, 'Shrouded in Shame': The Young Women on Either Side of Ireland's Abortion Debate' (June 2018), <https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2018/jan/30/ireland-abortion-referendum-debate-young-women> [accessed March 2019].

⁴ *Hexaemeron* 5.18.58: text in Nardi, *Procurato aborto*, pp. 531-2 in Allan D. Fitzgerald (ed.) *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopaedia* (Grand Rapids, 1999) p. 1.

⁵ Offence Against the Person Act (1861), clauses 58-9.

Historical Misconceptions about Views towards Abortion

The practice of abortion has often been mis-historicised. For most, abortion in the Medieval West was unknown or unthinkable to medieval couples.⁶ It has been commonly assumed that because of the ‘inherently religious’ nature of the Middle Ages, Church attitudes towards abortion must have been universally accepted. There has in the past been a significant focus on ecclesiastical condemnations of abortion but in recent years scholars have sought to understand the reality displayed outside these sources. The notion of a unified Christian age during the Middle Ages has been challenged by modern historians and previous ideas about the past have been brought under greater scrutiny. The Church's stance on abortion was set out in some of the earliest doctrine, but the extent to which it was disseminated amongst the lay community only really increased in the West between 1140 and 1240. This is when heretical groups such as the Cathars challenged Church authority and prompted a large-scale reform of canon law.⁷ One of the main points of consideration in procuring an abortion in this seemingly widely religious society was the ‘ensoulment’ of the foetus and the stage at which it could be considered a living human being. It can be seen in early canon law that ‘ensoulment’ was considered to be when the baby ‘quickened’ – when the mother could feel the baby moving. The Church thought this indicated that the child had a soul.⁸ This meant that until quite late on in the pregnancy, a child could be considered not yet living and abortion could be treated with less severity. This can be seen within secular law.

Examples of More Lenient Approaches towards Abortion

English law codes of the thirteenth-century are a prime example as they outline no direct penalties for the loss of an early developing foetus.⁹ As seen in the works of Fiona Harris-Stoertz, in the early Middle Ages there was a higher concern placed upon loss of a child by acts of external violence rather than by the mother procuring an abortion for herself.¹⁰ This changed, however, in the High Middle Ages as there was a shift in focus from loss of child through the actions of others to abortion by mothers. The difference between a quickened and non-quickened foetus once again came into play. The contrast between a sentence of seven

⁶ O. A. P. Ranum (ed.), *Popular Attitudes Towards Birth-Control in Pre-Industrial France and England* (New York, 1972) p. 6.

⁷ John T. Noonan (ed.), *The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives* (Cambridge 1970), p. 20.

⁸ Fiona Harris-Stoertz, ‘Pregnancy and Childbirth in Twelfth and Thirteenth century English Law’, *Journal of the History of Sexuality*, 21.2 (2012), p. 267.

⁹ *Leges Henrici Primi*, 70, 14-14a, ed. L. J. Downer (Oxford, 1972) pp. 222-3.

¹⁰ Stoertz, ‘Pregnancy and Childbirth in Twelfth and Thirteenth century English Law’, p. 268.

years penance for a developed child with three years for an undeveloped child reveals two things: 1) an early term abortion was more leniently treated in medieval society and 2) was more commonly a matter addressed by the Church.¹¹ To put this in context, the penance for childbirth was up to six years fasting on bread and water, whereas abortion was only three, revealing that even within ecclesiastical law this was not as severely punished as other perceived sins.¹² This is not to say that the Church in any way advocated the practice of abortion but in the medieval context there was a much more complex approach to this matter than once presumed. This is notably significant in terms of the modern discussion of abortion and what we consider to be 'life'. Many pro-life supporters perceive the beginning of life to be conception itself. This does not seem to have been the viewpoint espoused by ecclesiastical or secular authorities in the Middle Ages. This, therefore, challenges the notion of the medieval era being a period of abortion prohibition.

Abortion in Hagiography

Another area where there is disparity between expectations and reality of how abortion was viewed is that of hagiography. Saints *Lives* have often been valuable sources for the discussion of medieval ideas and, when used carefully, can give insight into how those in the Middle Ages understood the world. Returning once more to Ireland, Irish saints' *Lives* include tales of holy men and women performing what looks like pregnancy terminations. 'Holy abortion' features in the hagiographies of saints like Cieran who, in some manifestations of a well-known tale, aborted the child of a princess named Brunninech who was abducted and raped.¹³ This is particularly interesting as a comparator for an Irish case from 1992. Known as case X, it involved a fourteen-year-old girl seeking an abortion for her rapist's child.¹⁴ The Irish government refused to allow the girl or her family to travel to England to procure an abortion, employing what some described as a 'medieval' policy of repression. Whilst these 'holy abortions' did not include any type of medical procedure, they set the precedent that unwanted or illegitimate children could be removed. Irish hagiographies contain no less than four saintly abortionists, all of whom used the power of their blessing to rid women of their

¹¹ Stoertz, 'Pregnancy and Childbirth in Twelfth and Thirteenth century English Law', pp. 266-9.

¹² *The Irish Penitentials* ed. Ludwig Bieler (Dublin, 1963), pp. 78-81.

¹³ *Vita sancti Ciarani episcopi Saigirensis*, in Richard Sharpe (ed.), *Medieval Irish Saints' Lives: An Introduction to the Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae* (Oxford 1991), p. 348.

¹⁴ A.G. v. X [1992] IESC 1; [1992] 1 IR 1 (5th March 1992).

unwanted children.¹⁵ Although hagiographies are often seen as problematic sources, the inclusion of such tales within them shows that such problems were widespread enough to warrant discussion. As argued by Lisa Bitel, hagiographies may reveal a more nuanced approach to abortion within ecclesiastical circles.¹⁶ They, therefore, reveal how medieval approaches to abortion were not as transparent as previously thought.

Usage of Herbs as Abortifacients

Another main argument for the condemnation or lack of practice of abortion in Medieval Europe is the idea that people did not have the knowledge to perform abortions safely or effectively.¹⁷ While it is irrefutable that the medieval concept of medicine was, at least to modern eyes, flawed, to make the blanket assertion that they had no medical understanding whatsoever is unfounded. This idea is rooted in the more recent image of abortion as an act that can often result in serious harm or even death to the mother. This was a common occurrence in the twentieth century, as women undertook the risky procedure of back street abortion.¹⁸ John Riddle posits the view that during the Middle Ages there was a considerable knowledge base surrounding abortion and the right concoctions of herbs that could induce a miscarriage. Knowledge of such arts could have triggered repercussions, including accusations of witchcraft, as abortion was one of the ways in which a witch could be identified. Riddle challenges the works of previous scholars such as Himes in attributing little or no understanding of the medical properties of herbs as abortifacients to those in the Middle Ages.¹⁹ Riddle notes a plethora of plants and their uses that modern medical science has, in most cases, verified as stimulants of abortion. Within many medical handbooks there are references to solutions for promoting sluggish menstrual flow, which can be interpreted as having abortive properties, revealing that at least to some extent this was a codified understanding.²⁰ The greatest keepers of this knowledge, however, were women healers and midwives who passed their skills on orally to their successors. This is primarily why a lot of this knowledge has been

¹⁵ Maeve B. Callan, 'Vanishing Foetuses and Maidens Made-again: Abortion restored Virginity and Similar Scenarios in Irish Hagiography and Penitentials', *Journal of the History of Sexuality*, 21.2 (2012) pp. 283-88.

¹⁶ Lisa Bitel, *Land of Women: Tales of Sex and Gender from Early Ireland* (New York, 1996), p. 77.

¹⁷ Keith Hopkins, 'Contraception in the Roman Empire,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, VIII (1965-6) p. 131, Phillipe Airés, 'Sur les origines de la contraception en France', *Population*, VIII (1953) p. 466.

¹⁸ Pauline Jackson, 'Abortion Trials and Tribulations', *The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies*, 18.1, (1992) pp. 115-18.

¹⁹ John M. Riddle, 'Oral Contraceptives and Early-Term Abortifacients during Classical Antiquity and the Middle Ages', *Past & Present*, 132 (1991), pp. 3-32.

²⁰ Danielle Jaquart and Claude Thomasset, *Sexuality and Medicine in the Middle Ages*, trans. Matthew Adamson (Cambridge 1988), pp. 87-115.

lost, since it was never written down. In times when women were not seeking abortions regularly, such as after the plague of the 1340s, these skills tended to fall into obscurity.²¹ The increased hegemony of men in women's healthcare as the Middle Ages progressed meant that practices performed by women and the knowledge they purported were rejected since it did not follow their Galenic teaching.²² This meant that contraceptive and abortive methods were often disregarded, fuelling the idea that such knowledge never existed. The examples provided by Riddle opens up a contrasting viewpoint of how medieval society approached abortion and shows a situation where women could take relative charge of their reproductive capabilities, especially in the early period. The infringement of men upon these fields and subsequent loss of this knowledge speaks to a much wider problem.

Suppression of female medical knowledge and the effect this has had on modern conceptions of the body is just one example of how fields such as this can be gendered, and more significantly shift in gender. It reveals that through the increased influence of male authority over practices usually attributed to women, these areas became more and more inaccessible. The knowledge base that women had accrued was increasingly delegitimised as men came to play a greater role in the sphere of women's health and was, therefore, pushed out of public consciousness. Modern research into the existence of female medical knowledge is a major stride in gaining a greater understanding of how the place of women in medieval society compares and relates to the experiences of their modern-day counterparts.

Conclusions

Abortion history and its research are evolving in response to modern debates. Working alongside developments in modern attitudes towards abortion and female bodily autonomy, the history surrounding pregnancy termination is changing. As outlined here, medieval society was not devoid of discussion around pregnancy termination. The secular lawmakers and ecclesiastics of the time did not consistently condemn abortion nor treat it with the harshness that would be expected from contemporary approaches. It cannot be denied that it was a sin, but the way in which contemporary texts discuss and deal with it speaks volumes. A newly conceived child was not yet living in the eyes of the Church, saints could perform abortions,

²¹ Monica Green, 'Women's Medical Practice and Healthcare in Medieval Europe', *Signs*, 14.2 (1989), pp. 434-73.

²² Lynne Tatlock, 'Speculum Feminarum: Gendered Perspectives on Obstetrics and Gynaecology in Early Modern Germany', *Signs*, 17.4 (1992), pp. 725-60.

and women cultivated medical knowledge directly related to issues that affected them. When contrasting this with more recent attitudes towards abortion, women's health, and the right to choose, we have taken a virtual backwards step in terms of toleration of said acts. As indicated by Ireland's 2018 referendum, strides forward are being made and when looking at recent historical studies, the old precedents of the past are being challenged. With further research perhaps women can ultimately achieve liberty over their sexual and reproductive capabilities and the stigma surrounding abortion can be truly lifted.

Violence and Virtue: The Impact of Judith's Female Representation on Italian Proto-Feminism

Jennifer Lipman



Vincenzo Catena, *Judith*, oil on canvas, ca. 1517, Pinacoteca Querini Stampalia, Venice, public domain.¹

'Then Judith said to them, "Listen to me! I will do something that will go down from generation to generation among the descendants of our race."'
(Judith 8:32)

¹ Vincenzo Catena, *Judith*, oil on canvas, ca. 1517, Pinacoteca Querini Stampalia, Venice, public domain. Available from: http://www.querinistampalia.org/eng/uploads/Schede%20Museo_eng.pdf [accessed 21 February 2019].

The Book of Judith is a story of faith. The story opens with a city under siege by an Assyrian army with its people on the brink of surrender. When all hope is lost, a widow named Judith kills the enemy general. She is the unexpected hero with the strength to vanquish her enemies because of her faith in God. The story of Judith is part of the Apocrypha and is only considered canonical by Catholics and the Eastern Orthodox Church. It has, nonetheless, left a lasting impact on proto-feminist art and literature.² Since the early medieval period, male authors lauded Judith as the pinnacle of humility (*humilitas*) who overcame the embodiment of pride (*superbia*) in the form of the Assyrian general Holofernes.³ During the Italian Renaissance, there was a movement amongst women who not only self-identified with the warrior-heroine, but also used Judith's story to fight against social injustice. They pointed to her strength and faith to argue for gender equality, especially regarding women in leadership roles. In art, she could be seen as an avenger of victims. Remarkably, Judith was almost always depicted surrounded by violence, frequently bearing the decapitated head of Holofernes. She maintained her virtue and was praised a savior of her people. She was an icon for gender equality because when no other man could defeat the Assyrians, 'the Lord struck him [Holofernes] down by the hand of a *woman*'.⁴ In the minds of proto-feminist writers, this exemplified that God does not prefer man over woman – He only favors the faithful.⁵ The social impact of Judith's story is worth exploring because the search for expanded female representation is still an issue relevant today.

Judith as a Biblical Figure

The Book of Judith opens in the midst of war. Nebuchadnezzar, king of Assyria, summoned his general, Holofernes, to command his troops of 120,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry to descend on the Western territories.⁶ When the Israelites of Judah heard how the Assyrians had ransacked their sacred shrines, they were fearful for their safety and thus cried out to their Lord. Soon, Holofernes reached the city of Bethulia and his troops quickly restricted the water supplies and surrounded the city walls for thirty-four days. 'Their children

² The *Apocrypha* is a set of Biblical stories, such as the Book of Tobit or the story of Susanna and the Elders (which was added to the Book of Daniel), that are not considered canonical by Jews and Protestants. The Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church accept these texts as sacred.

³ Conrad of Hirsau, 'Speculum Virinum' in *Epithalamium: Audite o lucis filie* (Germany, c. 1140), fol. 34v. Public domain. Available from:

<https://www.bl.uk/catalogues/illuminatedmanuscripts/ILLUMIN.ASP?Size=mid&IllID=6977>.

⁴ Judith 8:10 (NRSV); Judith 13:15 (NRSV).

⁵ Arcangela Tarabotti, *Paternal Tyranny* ('*Semplicita Ingannata*'), trans. Letizia Panizza (Chicago, 2004), p. 132.

⁶ Judith 2:5-16 (NRSV).

were listless, and the women and youths were fainting from thirst and were collapsing in the streets and gateways of the city, with no strength left in them'⁷ The city was on the brink of collapse and surrender: the elders of the city have given the Lord a deadline of five days to intervene before they surrendered.

Judith summoned the elders and scolded them for trying to interfere with God's divine plan for He 'isn't like a human being who can be argued with, a person who can be threatened'.⁸ She implied that the Lord's divine plan was beyond human comprehension. Instead, emboldened by prayer, Judith brought her handmaiden to the Assyrian camp and visited the tent of the general, Holofernes. Although Holofernes lusted after the beautiful Judith, she was clever. She intoxicated him with wine and as he laid in a drunken stupor, she grabbed his sword from the bedpost. Judith asked God to bless her with the strength to carry out His will. Finally, she used all her might to decapitate the general. With the head of Holofernes in her food bag, Judith fled alongside her handmaiden to the gates of Bethulia. After having lost their general, the Assyrians lacked organization, and the Israelites were able to overcome their enemies. The city praised Judith's courage and faith. If it was not for her intervention, Bethulia would have perished.⁹

Although the Book of Judith is considered an 'inspired' text within the Catholic Church, it is important to briefly examine why it is not considered canonical amongst Jewish and Protestant communities. According to Rabbinic tradition, texts written after the Persian period were not 'inspired' and should not be included within the Hebrew Bible (the Book of Esther is the notable exception to this rule, as it explained the post-Torah tradition of Purim). The Book of Judith was a late Hellenized text composed during the diaspora.¹⁰ It included numerous inaccuracies ranging from Israel's geography to naming Nebuchadnezzar as the king of the Assyrians instead of the Babylonians. Even Judith's city of Bethulia may have been fabricated.¹¹ Nonetheless, the Book of Judith maintains its deuterocanonical status within the Catholic Church and Judith remained a prominent figure throughout the Italian Renaissance.

⁷ Judith 7:22 (NRSV).

⁸ Judith 8:16 (NRSV).

⁹ Judith 10:11-16:25 (NRSV).

¹⁰ Solomon Zeitlin, 'Introduction' in Solomon Zeitlin (ed.) *The Book of Judith: Greek Text with an English translation, Commentary and Critical Notes* (Philadelphia, 1972), p. 26.

¹¹ Benedict Otzen, *Tobit and Judith* (London, 2002), pp. 82-5.

Female Virtue and Chastity

The story of Judith aroused religious patriotism and it frames her as the ideal Jew: an embodiment of religious virtue. Judith's name, 'Yehudit', actually translates to 'Jewess' in Hebrew.¹² Despite being in the Apocrypha, the Book of Judith repeatedly connected with other liturgical texts, following in a tradition of exceptional leaders. Similar to Ruth, Judith was a virtuous widow living in a foreign city. Almost anytime Judith appears within secondary Biblical literature, she was mentioned alongside other Old Testament heroines such as Jael, Esther, and Deborah.¹³ Similar to Jael, Judith brought the enemy general into her tent, fed him wine, and she killed him as he slept.¹⁴ Also like Esther, Judith was the female saviour of her people.¹⁵ The Book of Esther, however, never names God in the text, but the Book of Judith leaves no ambiguity over His presence. Solomon Zeitlin even suggested that the Book of Judith was intended to usurp the authority of the Book of Esther in favor of a more religious patriotic narrative.¹⁶ Given that that the Book of Judith is a late Hellenized text, its author(s) could have easily drawn upon earlier Biblical archetypes for inspiration.

Just like young King David, Judith is the unexpected hero who defeated the enemy because God was on her side.¹⁷ Even as she cut off the head of the Assyrian general, she evoked the imagery of David decapitating Goliath's head, which threw the enemy camp into chaos.¹⁸ This symbolic comparison can be seen in the visual comparison between Donatello's *Judith and Holofernes* and *David* statues. Both bronze statues were commissioned for the Medici Palace courtyard c. 1456, symbolizing the family as defenders of Florentine liberty.¹⁹ Both Judith and David were depicted as the unexpected heroes of Israel who slew their enemy by decapitation and led their army to victory. At the base of Donatello's statue of Judith read the inscription, 'Kingdoms fall through sin, cities rise through virtues. Behold the neck of pride severed by the hand of humility'.²⁰ Even as the widow Judith takes on the traditionally masculine role of a warrior and commits a violent act of beheading, she maintains her humility

¹² Deborah Levine Gera, 'The Jewish Textual Traditions' in Kevin R. Brine, Elena Ciletti, and Henrike Lähnemann (eds.), *The Sword of Judith* (Cambridge, 2010), p. 24.

¹³ Crawford Sidnie White, 'In the Steps of Jael and Deborah: Judith as Heroine' in James C. VanderKam (ed.) *No One Spoke Ill of Her: Essays on Judith* (Atlanta, 1992), p. 6.

¹⁴ Judges 4: 19-21 (NRSV); Judith 13:1-9 (NRSV).

¹⁵ Judges 5:24-31 (NRSV); Esther 9 (NRSV).

¹⁶ Zeitlin, 'Introduction', p. 14.

¹⁷ 1 Samuel 17: 8-58 (NRSV).

¹⁸ 1 Samuel 17: 51 & 53 (NRSV); Judith 13:8 & Judith 15:5 (NRSV).

¹⁹ Sarah Blake McHam, 'Donatello's Bronze "David" and "Judith" as Metaphors of Medici Rule in Florence', *The Art Bulletin*, 83.1 (2001), p. 32.

²⁰ McHam, 'Donatello's Bronze "David" and "Judith" as Metaphors of Medici Rule in Florence', p. 37.

and virtue. The placement of Judith's image within the Medici courtyard was an act of familial-propaganda. It, nevertheless, speaks to the symbolic potency of Judith's image as a heroine.

Another hurdle for early proto-feminists was the argument of 'chastity'. Thomas Aquinas expounded the doctrine that it was Eve's lack of chastity and excessive pride that led the Fall.²¹ This interpretation bled into popular belief. Every woman's virtue was broadly compared to either Eve (the sinner) or Mary (the sinless, virgin mother).²² However, the Virgin Mary's absence of original sin was an impossible standard for women to be held against. It was Judith's chastity and humility which made her such a remarkable figure. She was able to break away from the virgin-seductress dichotomy. She was neither a virgin nor a mother.²³ She was not endowed by God any special gifts of sanctity. She was an ordinary woman with extraordinary faith. Even having gone into another man's tent with the allure of seduction and then violently decapitating him, Judith maintained her chastity. Judith's image surpasses gender stereotypes and as proto-feminists campaigned for gender equality they had to reach for role-models that were also accepted by their male oppressors. Where Eve was condemned for her pursuit of knowledge, Judith's courageous leadership made her 'the glory of Jerusalem, thou art the joy of Israel, thou art the honor of our people'.²⁴ She is not scolded for her immodesty, but celebrated as the glory and joy of the Jewish people. Judith does not neatly fit into any set archetype. Instead, she appeared to be an amalgamation of Israel's most virtuous heroes – and that was a very potent image for proto-feminist writers.

Judith as a Leader

The image of Judith was frequently referenced in proto-feminist literature with the aim of achieving gender equality. In her book, *Paternal Tyranny*, Arcangela Tarabotti rages against the assumption of feminine weakness. Since the Catholic Church utilised the Bible's tradition of virtuous men, Tarabotti responded with violent praise for Judith. She argues:

How can they [women] be weak when they faced death itself, when they have always been strong not only in suffering but in every other necessity?

²¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica: Second Part of the Second Part QQ. CXXI – CLXX* trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London, 1921), pp. 259-261 (Question 163, Article 4).

²² Margaret L. King and Albert Rabil Jr., 'The Other Voice in Early Modern Europe: Introduction to the Series' in Jane Tylus (ed.) *Sacred Narratives* (Chicago, 2001), pp. 5-6.

²³ Ruth 1:4-5 (NRSV), Judith 8:3-8 (NRSV).

²⁴ Judith 15:10 (NRSV).

Who will deny Judith's courage? With striking fearlessness, she severed the head of Holofernes and freed her country from a deadly siege.²⁵

This is a direct refutation of the cultural stereotype that women were unfit to lead or govern because of their natural fragility. This idea was propagated by both contemporary Biblical scholarship and classical texts ranging from Aristotle to Galen, both of whom referred to the female form as 'mutilated males'.²⁶

Members of the Church regularly used religious commentaries from the Middle Ages, such as Thomas Aquinas', which instructed women to be subordinate to their husbands.²⁷ Biblical texts were deployed by the community to exclude and subordinate women. In response, Tarabotti analysed incongruities within Biblical texts, slowing dismantling the 'wicked and false slander written by men over so many centuries to the detriment of women'.²⁸ Tarabotti goes on to argue that women possess natural leadership qualities and thus should be admitted to the Venetian senate.²⁹ Unlike other Biblical figures, Judith was never the recipient of an angel's intercession or a prophet's selection. She was not born with supernatural strength.³⁰ However, her status as the ordinary but virtuous widow makes Judith an accessible role-model. She was praised by proto-feminists and her place in didactic literature was meant to inspire individuals to follow in her footsteps.

In her long form poem, *Sacred Narratives*, Lucrezia Tornabuoni de' Medici lauded the deeds of Judith as she led Israel to victory. Born in early 15th century with an exceptional pedigree, Lucrezia Tornabuoni was offered a unique position of political power in a time when women were largely excluded. Her parents were from the two oldest Florentine families, the Tornabuoni and Guicciardini, and in 1444, she married to the powerful patriarch, Cosimo de' Medici.³¹ As a woman, Tornabuoni was still excluded from wielding power through legislation. However, she was presented with a unique opportunity to enact change in the wider

²⁵ Tarabotti, *Paternal*, pp. 140-1.

²⁶ King and Rabil Jr., 'Introduction', pp. viii-ix.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. xi-xii.

²⁸ Tarabotti, *Paternal*, p. 157.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

³⁰ As had been seen throughout multiple Biblical stories such as Mary's Immaculate Conception, the kingship of Saul, or the strength of Samson, respectively.

³¹ Gerry Milligan, *Lucrezia Tornabuoni*, 26 August 2011

<<http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195399301/obo-9780195399301-0174.xml>>
[2 April 2019].

community through patronage. It is thus possible to see why Tornabuoni could have self-identified with Judith's feminine strength in a traditionally masculine role.

Within Lucrezia's poetry about Judith, she wrote:

I found her story written in prose, and I was greatly impressed by her courage:
a fearful little widow,
she had your [God's] help, and she knew what to do and say;
Lord you made her bold and helped her plan succeed.
Would that you grant such a favor to me.³²

The poem highlighted both Judith's religious piety as well as her ability to inspire hope among the leaders of Bethulia. Gerry Milligan has argued that 'in a world of violence that women would normally have been powerless to stop, it is a tale of the power that is accessible to women'.³³ Tornabuoni directly asked for the strength and courage bestowed upon Judith by God because it demonstrated that even a 'fearful little widow' can enact great change.

Judith as an Avenger

The theme of sexual abuse against women in the Book of Judith is not immediately obvious upon first reading the text. Yet, it speaks volumes not only for Judith's contextual courage, but also her role as an avenger. In chapter nine, Judith alludes to a story in the Book of Genesis. Before she set out to the Assyrian camp, the Book of Judith directly references the rape of Dinah.³⁴ She cried out:

"O Lord God of my ancestor Simeon, to whom you gave a sword to take revenge on those strangers who had torn off a virgin's clothing to defile her, and exposed her thighs to put her to shame, and polluted her womb to disgrace her; for you said, 'It shall not be done' – yet they did it; ³ so you gave up their rulers to be killed, and their bed, which was ashamed of the deceit they had practiced, was stained with blood, and you struck down slaves along with princes, and princes on their thrones.'³⁵

³² Lucrezia Tornabuoni, *Sacred Narratives ('Pometti Sacri')* trans. Jane Tylus (Chicago, 2001), p. 123.

³³ Gerry Milligan, 'Unlikely Heroines in Lucrezia Tornabuoni's *Judith* and *Esther*', *Italica*, 88.4, p. 547.

³⁴ Genesis 34 (NRSV).

³⁵ Judith 9:2-3 (NRSV).

Although Dinah was violated by a foreign prince, Judith asks the Lord that she should not receive the same fate. She identified not with the victim, but the avenger. Judith called upon the memory of her ancestor, Simeon, not Dinah, as she prayed for strength. Just as Simeon had done before her, she would also slaughter the lustful enemy in his own bed.

In the Scripture, Judith is acutely aware of the danger she faces as a woman. The Holofernes says to his eunuch, 'It would bring shame on us to be with such a woman without enjoying her. If we do not seduce her, she will laugh at us.'³⁶ Pursued by a lustful general and alone in an enemy camp for four days, Judith must gather extraordinary strength to carry out her mission. Yet, this bravery does not go without praise. St. Jerome famously wrote in his *Letters*, 'Here a woman [Judith] vanquishes men, and chastity beheads lust'.³⁷ This narrative still promotes the emphasis on female chastity. Judith's story, however, speaks out as an avenger for abused women.

One of the most famous depictions of Judith is the 1620 oil on canvas, *Judith Beheading Holofernes* by Artemisia Gentileschi. The daughter of a prominent baroque painter of the Caravaggesque style, Orazio Gentileschi, Artemisia showed promise as an artist from a very young age. By the time Artemisia had reached eighteen-years-old, her father hired the painter, Agostino Tassi, as a tutor for Artemisia. However, in May 1611, Tassi raped Artemisia and forced her into an extramarital affair for ten months on the promise he would eventually marry her. Orazio eventually brought Tassi to trial during March 1612 for deflowering his daughter. After seven months of questioning under torture during the trial, Artemisia was exonerated of responsibility. Tassi was initially sentenced to five years of exile from Rome, however this judgement was soon annulled by his patrons.³⁸

Among her body of work, Gentileschi created four known Judith portraits. She was also heavily influenced by the style of baroque artist, Caravaggio. Despite depicting the same scenes, however, Artemisia's paintings are far more intense and intimate. While Caravaggio's *Judith* calmly stands back as she slits the throat of Holofernes, Artemisia's *Judith* is characterised by the forceful plunging of the dagger and graphic squirts of blood.³⁹

³⁶ Judith 12:12 (NRSV).

³⁷ St. Jerome, *Letters*, 54:16 in Henricus Cornelius Agrippa, *Declamations on the Nobility and Preeminence of the Female Sex* trans. Albert Rabil Jr. (Chicago, 1996), pp. 87-8.

³⁸ Elizabeth S. Cohen, 'The Trials of Artemisia Gentileschi: A Rape as History', *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 31.1 *Special Edition: Gender in Early Modern Europe* (2000), p. 49.

³⁹ Caravaggio, *Judith Beheading Holofernes* (1599), Palazzo Barberini, Rome. Public domain. Available from: <https://www.barberiniconsig.org/en/opera/judith-beheading-holofernes/>.

Additionally, Gentileschi painted Judith as a self-portrait, just as she had done for her 1615 portrait of the martyred St. Catherine of Alexandria.⁴⁰

Within modern feminist scholarship of Artemisia's art, there is a renewed emphasis on Artemisia as a survivor of rape. Art historian Mary Garrard has discussed how several academics have speculated whether Artemisia's portrait is a demonstration of revenge against Tassi. She explained, 'in an equation that is both biblical and Freudian, between decapitation and castration: the just punishment for rape is an eye-for-an-eye tradition'.⁴¹ Garrard agrees that it would be an oversimplification to say that Artemisia's body of work was *only* influenced by her trauma of sexual abuse.⁴² Gentileschi was influenced by the work of her father, Caravaggio's movement, and she was the first woman admitted into the Florentine Academy of Fine Arts.⁴³ Nonetheless, her work was comprised of strong women (such as Judith, Esther, or female martyrs) and women who experienced sexual trauma (such as Susanna or Lucretia). Given the theme of *femme fortes* throughout her portfolio, it is fair to say that her sexual abuse did have some impact on her work. Unlike the traditionally passive portraits of women, as seen with Caravaggio's *Judith*, Gentileschi's work was vividly self-reflected. Just as Judith stood as the avenger of Dinah, she also stood as an emblem of defeating lustful men.

Conclusions

It would be an oversimplification to say that the Biblical representation of women in the early modern period was limited to either the wanton seductress of Eve or the sinless virgin-mother of Mary. Judith is a widow, but not a mother. Despite almost always depicted with the decapitated head of Holofernes in artwork, she remained traditionally feminine and is praised as the pinnacle of female virtue. Although the image of a 'warrior' is traditionally masculine, she saved her when the leading patriarchs could not. Overall, Judith contributed to the idea of positive female representation within the Catholic Bible. She was a warrior of faith, saviour of

Artemisia Gentileschi, *Judith Beheading Holofernes* (1620), Uffizi Gallery, Venice. Public Domain. Available from: <<https://www.uffizi.it/en/artworks/judith-beheading-holofernes>>.

⁴⁰ Artemisia Gentileschi, *Self Portrait as Saint Catherine of Alexandria* (1615), National Gallery, London. Public domain. Available from: <<https://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/artemisia-gentileschi-self-portrait-as-saint-catherine-of-alexandria>>.

⁴¹ Mary D Garrard, *Artemisia Gentileschi: The Image of the Female Hero in Italian Baroque Art* (Princeton, 1989), p. 278.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ National Gallery, *Artemisia Gentileschi, 1593-1654 or later* <<https://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/artists/artemisia-gentileschi>> [2 April 2019].

people, and slayer of tyrants. She is an avenger-figure for victims of sexual assault through the narrative of Dinah. Women identified themselves with the story's protagonist. Most importantly, they admired Judith's courage and strength in the face of adversity. As an ordinary woman of extraordinary faith, Judith was both aspirational and accessible.

Part III: Climate Change & Environmentalism

Non-state actors in the Arctic: Lessons from the 1920 Svalbard Treaty Negotiations

Luke Campopiano

To state that the Arctic is melting has become a scientific truism. The Arctic is warming at twice the rate of the rest of the world.¹ This has led to a significant decrease in the amount of sea ice in the Arctic. This trend will likely quicken in coming years, as melting sea ice decreases the albedo of the region, leading to more solar energy absorption and further melting.² The decreased levels of sea ice will make the Arctic more accessible for economic activities, such as oil drilling, shipping, and cruises. An alarming media narrative has emerged that there will be a ‘race for resources’ or a ‘new Cold War.’³ Most Arctic policy scholars argue that the so-called race will be significantly constrained by international legal regimes, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.⁴ It is, nevertheless, undeniable that the present era is one of great turmoil in the Arctic. As such, it is useful to analyze potential threats to the safety of the Arctic region.

In the mass media of Western nations, the most commonly considered Arctic threats are states, specifically China and Russia. Indeed, these media narratives evoke both territorial scrambles by colonial powers and the Cold War. Given these historical precedents, it is not surprising that non-state actors are under-appreciated in Arctic analysis. The exclusion of non-

¹ Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, *Impacts of a Warming Arctic*, 2004

<<https://www.amap.no/documents/download/1058/inline>> [12 May 2019].

² J. C. Comiso, C. L. Parkinson, T. Markus, D. J. Cavalieri, and R. Gersten, *Current State of the Sea Ice Cover*, 10 May 2019, <<https://neptune.gsfc.nasa.gov/csb/index.php?section=234>> [12 May 2019].

³ Sarah Gardner, *Arctic race for resources heats up*, 22 February 2012, <<https://www.marketplace.org/2012/02/22/world/arctic-race-resources-heats>> [12 May 2019];

Jennifer Griffin, *New ‘Cold’ War? Russia touts Arctic military base, as US struggles to catch up*, 28 April 2017, <<https://www.foxnews.com/politics/new-cold-war-russia-touts-arctic-military-base-as-us-struggles-to-catch-up>> [12 May 2019].

⁴ Kathrin Stephen, *Taking Stock of the “Race(s) for the Arctic”*, 21 February 2013

<<https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/taking-stock-race-arctic/>> [12 May 2019];

Timo Koivurova, *The Arctic conflict: truth, fantasy or a little bit of both?*, 18 November 2019

<<https://web.archive.org/web/20161222163810/http://www.arcticnow.com:80/voices/analysis/2016/11/18/the-arctic-conflict-truth-fantasy-or-a-little-bit-of-both/>> [12 May 2019].

state actors is exemplified by the Arctic Council, which is the main international body for the Arctic. It was founded in 1996 to reach cooperative solutions on issues such as the environment, sustainable development, and scientific research. Military and security issues were explicitly excluded from the Arctic Council's purview.⁵ The Council is formed of eight member nations and six Permanent Participant indigenous groups.⁶ Nations and organizations that are not members may also attend Arctic Council meetings as observers. Recently, however, the pace of the acceptance of new observers has slowed significantly, especially for organizations. In 2013, six nations were admitted as observers, but no organizations. A consensus seems to have developed in the Arctic Council that the needs of its member nations must take precedence over those of other actors.⁷

A deeply concerning incident occurred in 2008, when the five coastal Arctic nations (the USA, Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark) came together to sign the Ilulissat Declaration. This meeting marginalized the other three Arctic nations (Iceland, Sweden, and Finland), as well as indigenous groups. In 2009, the Inuit Circumpolar Council firmly declared its right to be consulted over important matters in the Arctic.⁸ The Arctic Council's emphasis on the role of states to the exclusion of all other actors has already begun to generate a backlash. In 2013, the Icelandic president presided over the first meeting of the new Arctic Circle assembly. The audience was very diverse, including members from Arctic and non-Arctic nations, corporations, indigenous groups, and NGOs. In a speech, the Icelandic president emphasized the Arctic Circle's role as a forum for a wide variety of groups interested in the Arctic. The creation of the expansive Arctic Circle was due, in large part, to a perception that the Arctic Council was too restrictive in its membership.⁹

The institutional neglect of non-state actors is mirrored by the scholarly literature. One of the few analyses of non-state threats to the stability of the Arctic explored terrorists, pirates,

⁵ Arctic Council, *Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council*, 1996, <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF> [12 May 2019].

⁶ Arctic Council, *The Arctic Council: A backgrounder*, 13 September 2018, <<https://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us>> [12 May 2019].

⁷ Heather Exner-Pirot, *The Third Wheel: Observers in the Arctic Council*, 23 March 2015, <<http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2015/03/23/the-third-wheel-observers-in-the-arctic-council/>> [12 May 2019].

⁸ Inuit Circumpolar Council, *A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic*, 7 May 2015, <<https://www.lawnnow.org/circumpolar-inuit-declaration-sovereignty-arctic/>> [12 May 2019].

⁹ Paul Koring, *New Arctic group gives Canada political competition*, 11 May 2018, <<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/new-arctic-group-gives-canada-political-competition/article11243970/>> [12 May 2019].

criminal gangs, drug and human trafficking, natural disasters, and accidents. It concluded that shipping accidents are the most concerning threat because of the difficulty of rescue attempts and potential environmental impacts.¹⁰ While this is certainly valuable information, the article does not explore the positive or negative roles that non-state actors not classified as threats will play in the Arctic. Furthermore, much of the scholarship that explores the role of non-state actors in the Arctic is specific and does not attempt to generalize about the wider group of non-state actors. To ameliorate understanding of the role played by non-state actors in the contemporary Arctic, this paper will explore the historical precedent of the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, which resolved a decades-long dispute over the sovereignty of the Svalbard archipelago. Using this historical perspective, this article will draw conclusions for a variety of non-state actors in the contemporary Arctic.

Background

Svalbard is an archipelago located roughly midway between Norway and the North Pole.¹¹ The entire archipelago was known as Spitsbergen until 1925. Today, only the main island is still called Spitsbergen.¹² This paper will use the term Svalbard, even when speaking of historical negotiations that occurred before the name change. The first confirmed sighting of Svalbard was by the Dutch explorer Willem Barents in 1596. Svalbard has no indigenous population, but was eventually peopled by Europeans, especially Norwegians and Russians.¹³

For much of its history, Svalbard was not claimed as territory by any nation. It was understood to be *terra nullius*, a Latin term meaning no man's land. The history of the concept of *terra nullius* is complicated and still not completely understood. It appears to have evolved out of the Roman legal concept of *res nullius*, which means an object not owned by anyone. By the end of the nineteenth century, the term *territorium nullius* was employed in discussions of colonialism in Africa. Certain legal theorists argued that various 'uncivilized' peoples were not sufficiently developed to hold sovereignty over their land, which was, therefore, *territorium*

¹⁰ Donna J. Nincic, 'Maritime Security in the Arctic: The threat from non-state actors,' *The 13th Annual General Assembly of the JAMU: Expanding Frontiers -Challenges and Opportunities in Maritime Education and Training* (2012), pp. 289-99.

¹¹ Geir Ulfstein, *The Svalbard Treaty; From Terra Nullius to Norwegian Sovereignty* (Oslo, 1995), p. 17.

¹² Norwegian Polar Institute, *The Place Names of Svalbard and Jan Mayen*, 26 February 2010, <<https://web.archive.org/web/20110606113449/http://miljo.npolar.no/placenames/pages/detaile.asp?placeNameID=813614P>> [12 May 2019].

¹³ Ulfstein, *The Svalbard Treaty*, p. 26.; Dag Avango, Louwrens Hacquebord, Ypie Aalders, Hidde De Haas, Ulf Gustafsson, and Frigga Kruse, 'Between markets and geo-politics: Natural resource exploitation on Spitsbergen from 1600 to the present day,' *Polar Record* 47.1 (2011), pp. 32-3.

nullius and open to claim by European powers. *Terra nullius* in its current form originated at the very beginning of the twentieth century, specifically relating to Svalbard. The meaning of the term was in flux during the negotiation of the status of Svalbard. The treaty discussions would play an outsized role in the standardization of the definition of *terra nullius* and thus held the potential to create important legal and diplomatic impacts extending far beyond the Arctic.¹⁴

History of the Svalbard Negotiations

In 1871, Sweden-Norway proposed a potential annexation of Svalbard and inquired if any nations with potential interests in Svalbard had objections. Most of the countries that Sweden-Norway contacted were accepting of the proposal, except for Russia, which argued that it also had significant historical claims. The issue was then shelved indefinitely.¹⁵ By the first decade of the twentieth century, commercial activity was growing quickly in Svalbard.¹⁶ This led to increased claim jumping, business disputes, and international tensions. Both Norway and Russia agreed that certain administrative changes needed to be made, although they were careful to stress the continuance of Svalbard's *terra nullius* status.¹⁷ International negotiations in 1910 and 1912 failed to garner much momentum. A conference in 1914 showed that it would be quite difficult to forge cooperation between the Scandinavian nations and other countries. It ultimately ended prematurely with the First World War on the horizon.¹⁸ After the end of the war, the Svalbard issue returned to the agenda. Svalbard was included as part of the Versailles Peace Conference, even though it had played no role in the First World War.¹⁹

The result of the negotiations was the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, signed by the United States, Great Britain, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Russia was not permitted to sign the treaty because its Soviet government was not recognized by the American government. Russia would not sign the treaty until American recognition in the 1930s.²⁰ The treaty placed Svalbard under the 'full and absolute sovereignty of Norway'.

¹⁴ For a thorough exposition of the evolution of *terra nullius* see Andrew Fitzmaurice, 'The genealogy of *Terra Nullius*,' *Australian Historical Studies* 38.129 (2007), pp. 1-15.

¹⁵ Elen C. Singh, *The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Question: United States Foreign Policy, 1907-1935* (Oslo, 1980), pp. 23-4.

¹⁶ Avango, Hacquebord, Aalders, De Haas, Gustafsson, and Kruse, 'Natural resource exploitation,' p. 33.

¹⁷ In 1905, a referendum dissolved the Sweden-Norway union. See CIA, *The World Factbook: Norway*, 7 May 2019, <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/no.html>> [12 May 2019].

¹⁸ Singh, *The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Question*, pp. 48-83.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 90-3.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 106-27.

At the same time, however, the other nations who signed the treaty would be entitled to ‘equal liberty of access’ and the ability to engage in economic activity with ‘absolute equality’.²¹ These seemingly contradictory statements about Svalbard result in complex legal issues. The most important contemporary dispute is over the capability of Norway to establish an Exclusive Economic Zone in Svalbard’s territorial waters.²²

A variety of types of non-state actors influenced the outcome of the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920. This paper will focus on two main groups: corporations and a variety of scientists and explorers that Elen Singh terms the Svalbard ‘Literature Lobby’.²³ The groups are, of course, not so easily separated. Explorers, such as Martin Conway and William Spiers Bruce, were politically active members of the Royal Geographic Society, as well as significant investors in mining projects in Svalbard. This essay will rely primarily on Singh’s book-length account of American diplomacy involving Svalbard, with the addition of a number of scholarly articles that explore the British experience. I will also analyse several of the works of the ‘Literature Lobby’ to show their power for influencing the negotiation process. While all of these component subjects have been explored thoroughly, this paper is the first to unify them into a cohesive view about the role of non-state actors during the Svalbard negotiations and to draw conclusions for the contemporary Arctic.

Corporations

Economic activity has had a long history in the Svalbard archipelago. Whaling began in the region only a few years after the Barents sighting in 1596.²⁴ Competition arose between English and Dutch whalers that lasted throughout the first half of the seventeenth century. This activity decreased in the latter half of the century due to changing ice conditions. In the eighteenth century, Russian walrus hunters known as Pomors occupied the archipelago. Large-scale settlement of Svalbard came only in the second half of the nineteenth century as a result

²¹ Norwegian Royal Ministry of Justice, *Treaty of 9 February 1920 relating to Spitsbergen (Svalbard)*, 1988, <<https://app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/data/lov-19250717-011-eng.pdf>> [12 May 2019].

²² Christopher R. Rossi, “‘A Unique International Problem’: The Svalbard Treaty, Equal Enjoyment, and Terra Nullius: Lessons of Territorial Temptation from History,” *Washington University Global Studies Law Review* 15.1 (2015), pp. 97-8.

²³ Singh, *The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Question*, p. 94.

²⁴ Avango, Hacquebord, Aalders, De Haas, Gustafsson, and Kruse, ‘Natural resource exploitation,’ p. 30.

of mining companies. The most valuable resource discovered in Svalbard was coal. Mining companies would come to exert an outsized influence on diplomatic outcomes in Svalbard.²⁵

A number of British mining companies emerged in Svalbard in the first decade of the twentieth century, but soon the Scottish Spitsbergen Syndicate and the Northern Exploration Company took precedence. The Scottish Spitsbergen Syndicate was founded in 1908 by William Spiers Bruce, a renowned Scottish polar explorer. He was able to leverage his reputation as an Arctic expert to gain increased support for the enterprise. In 1912, Bruce lobbied the British government to consider annexing Svalbard to secure property rights. Even the Royal Geographic Society, an organization that traditionally avoided overt political activism, attempted to influence the decision of the British government. Ultimately, the British government chose not to take action despite Bruce's lobbying, likely because it was focusing more on important German territories that would become British mandates.²⁶

In the United States, the government was far more susceptible to lobbying than in Britain. Frederick Ayer and John Longyear founded the Arctic Coal Company in 1906. The company purchased land in Svalbard and was in frequent contact with the US State Department to make sure that its property rights were protected. As seemingly the only American actor that was interested in Svalbard, the Arctic Coal Company exerted significant control over American policy.²⁷ From 1909 to 1910, the Company attempted to secure passage of legislation that would allow an American claim of sovereignty over Svalbard. The bill was ultimately dismissed for fear of international repercussions.²⁸ Longyear and Ayer continued to influence the State Department's Svalbard policy by pushing for the arrangement of conferences, as well as avoiding negotiations that they thought would lead to Norwegian sovereignty and the introduction of taxation.²⁹ They even made the remarkable suggestion that Svalbard be run by an international corporation with a portion of its stock available for purchase by participating nations.³⁰ The Arctic Coal Company's remarkable influence over the US State Department

²⁵ Louwrens Hacquebord and Dag Avango, 'Settlements in an Arctic Resource Frontier Region,' *Arctic Anthropology* 46.1-2 (2009), pp. 26-32.

²⁶ Louwrens Hacquebord, *LASHIPA: History of Large Scale Resource Exploitation in Polar Areas* (Groningen, 2012), pp. 67-70.

²⁷ Singh, *The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Question*, pp. 12-19, 36.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-43.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-35, 48-66.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 56, 206.

only ended in 1918 when it became clear that it had sold off all of its claims to land in Svalbard.³¹

Spitsbergen Literature Lobby

The influence of non-state actors over the Svalbard negotiations was not confined to corporations. Another significant group in the negotiations was the Svalbard ‘Literature Lobby.’ Elen Singh uses this term to refer to a number of publications that emerged at the end of the First World War in 1918 and 1919. These works attempted to persuade national governments to hold a specific position on the question of Svalbard’s sovereignty. Lobbyists from the Netherlands explored the role the Dutch had played in Svalbard’s early history. British and American lobbyists primarily detailed the economic utility of the islands. Norwegians compiled a robust literature to demonstrate that Svalbard ought to be granted to Norway. Prominent members of the ‘Literature Lobby’ were the French naturalist, Charles Rabot, the Norwegian geologist, Adolf Hoel, as well as Conway and Bruce. These writers were published in newspapers, handbooks, and scientific journals. They included topics such as settlement history, economic value of the islands, and legal claims.³²

The efforts of the ‘Literature Lobby,’ along with the enthusiasm of the Norwegian Minister Wedel-Jarlsberg, would tell in favor of Norway’s claims. As the United States no longer had any business interests in Svalbard, it was in favor of Norwegian sovereignty. Svalbard had become an interesting legal and philosophical issue, instead of a concern for American interests. Robert Lansing, who later became American Secretary of State, told foreign ministers that he favored Norwegian sovereignty.³³ He wrote an article in 1917 for *The American Journal of International Law* that considered Svalbard as ‘A Unique International Problem,’ albeit one that had been opened by ‘American enterprise and energy’.³⁴

British writers in the ‘Literature Lobby’ were far more passionate. In the 1919 article ‘Spitsbergen, *Terra Nullius*,’ the British polar explorer R. N. Rudmose Brown details the history of the Svalbard archipelago. He lists a number of important British explorations of the region and claims that ‘no living man knows more of Spitsbergen than Dr. W. S. Bruce’. He

³¹ Singh, *The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Question*, pp. 88-9.

³² Mary Katherine Jones, ‘Spitsbergen Literature Lobby,’ *Nordlit* 32 (2014), pp. 33-35.

³³ Singh, *The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Question*, p. 89.

³⁴ Robert Lansing, ‘A Unique International Problem,’ *The American Journal of International Law* 11.4 (1917), p. 771.

casts doubt on Norwegian claims because they were ‘late in the field.’³⁵ Brown argues that Svalbard is *terra nullius*, but acknowledges that the current lawless situation in Svalbard is unacceptable. Britain has ‘an undeniable claim’ and Norway has developed key infrastructure. The best solution, according to Brown, is an agreement between the two nations that either grants sole sovereignty or allows joint control.³⁶

Charles Rabot, a French supporter of Norwegian claims to Svalbard, had a much different historical story to tell. In his 1919 article “The Norwegians in Spitsbergen,” Rabot takes previous writers to task for ignoring ‘the great work done by the Norwegians in this archipelago.’ He especially emphasizes the role of Norwegian walrus hunters in the latter half of the nineteenth century.³⁷ With respect to industry, Rabot claims that ‘the best-developed collieries [coal mines] in Spitsbergen belong to Norwegian companies.’ The British, by contrast, are ‘far behind’.³⁸ Rabot’s most startling argument is that Svalbard is not *terra nullius*, but a Norwegian possession by inheritance of a seventeenth century Danish claim. Rabot allows that the “sovereignty is not complete, not having been recognized by all the powers’.³⁹ Nevertheless, his article seems to suggest that the historical claim combined with de facto Norwegian occupation of Svalbard should be sufficient grounds for full Norwegian sovereignty. We have thus seen how the members of the ‘Literature Lobby’ used the history of exploration and current economic factors to justify varying national claims of sovereignty over Svalbard. In a time of widespread governmental apathy or ignorance of Svalbard, these non-state actors controlled the diplomatic discourse.

The Norwegians were ultimately granted sovereignty in 1920 with relatively little dispute.⁴⁰ This surprisingly easy victory occurred for a number of reasons, including effective Norwegian lobbying, declining American involvement, British preoccupation with the German mandate, and the marginalization of countries such as Germany and Russia in the negotiation process.

³⁵ R. N. Rudmose Brown, ‘Spitsbergen, *Terra Nullius*,’ *Geographical Review* 7.5 (1919), p. 316.

³⁶ Brown, ‘Spitsbergen, *Terra Nullius*’, pp. 318-21.

³⁷ Charles Rabot, ‘The Norwegians in Spitsbergen,’ *Geographical Review* 8.4-5 (1919), pp. 209, 213-16.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 225-6.

⁴⁰ Singh, *The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Question*, pp. 100-108.

Lessons for the Modern Arctic

In contemporary Arctic political discourse, there exists a common misconception that national governments are monolithic entities with a single point of view. This error partially explains the emphasis placed on states to the exclusion of all other actors in analysis. Arctic scholars have much to learn from historians on this point. In discussion of the British Empire, for example, historians have emphasized the complex and multifaceted nature of the imperial project. As one article puts it: ‘there is not one Britain but rather several British imperialists, so called because everyone living in an age of empire was invariably imperially tainted’.⁴¹ These non-state actors, while all contributing to the development on the British Empire, have independent aims and actions. Indeed, in some cases, local events and pragmatic actions by agents of the Empire led to results completely unexpected and unintended by the ‘official mind’ of bureaucrats in London.⁴²

Similarly, the non-state actors that were most influential in the negotiations resulting in the Svalbard Treaty of 1920 were part of the imperial system. This essay has identified the two most significant groups as corporations and the ‘Literature Lobby.’ These groups were able to lobby government institutions, stir public sentiments, and shape the terms of the international negotiations. No understanding of the Svalbard negotiations can exist without recognizing the essential roles played by such non-state actors. There are several clear links between the non-state actors of the 1920s and the present day. While the imperialist systems of nineteenth century Britain and the Svalbard negotiators of the 1920s have changed greatly, the historical methodology used to explore such systems remains useful.

We can discard the naïve conception of Arctic states as monolithic actors and replace it with an emphasis on understanding the inner workings of power projection in the Arctic. Groups that are essential to this process are scientists, lobbyists, and the media. Scientists play an outsized role in Arctic policy, with a significant membership in the Arctic Council. Scientists are also involved in the contentious area of territorial claims in the Arctic. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, scientific claims about undersea ridges have

⁴¹ Hacquebord, *LASHIPA*, p. 62.

⁴² For more on the “official mind,” see *Africa and the Victorians*. For an example of an imperial ‘absence of mind’ à la Seeley see Margaret Ackrill, ‘British Imperialism in Microcosm: The Annexation of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands,’ *London School of Economics & Political Science Working Papers in Economic History* (1994).

tremendous importance for determining the scope of national territory.⁴³ The involvement of scientists in such inherently political research risks the politicization of science to further national ends. This politicization is deeply concerning, as it threatens to undermine the authority of science in major environmental issues, particularly climate change.⁴⁴

Lobbying on Arctic issues, especially in the United States, allows corporations to have an outsized say on government policy. It is very unlikely that the effective monopoly on State Department policy on Svalbard held by the Arctic Coal Company in the 1920s will reappear in the modern day. The Arctic, nevertheless, remains relatively obscure to the American public, which allows corporations to make significant lobbying efforts while remaining low profile.⁴⁵ The mass media also has an important impact on Arctic policy. A sample of news on the Arctic from Fox, CNN, and Anchorage Daily News included 22 articles promoting a ‘race for resources’ narrative and only one presenting a ‘responsible global governance’ narrative.⁴⁶ This coverage, considered misleading by Arctic experts, will undoubtedly shape popular opinion in ways that will encourage conflict and escalation in the Arctic.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the negotiations surrounding the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920 show that the Arctic cannot be separated from broader global issues. The conception of *terra nullius* as developed in the Svalbard negotiations would prove influential in legal contexts in regions as far afield as Western Sahara and Australia. Similarly, the contemporary Arctic must be understood in a global context. Whether the issue is climate change, sustainable development, or territorial claims, the Arctic can serve as a laboratory for legal, political, and diplomatic solutions that will have global significance.

⁴³ Paulo Neves Coelho, *What is the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf?*, July 2013, <<http://www.institut-ocean.org/images/articles/documents/1374481543.pdf>> [12 May 2019].

⁴⁴ Daniel Sarewitz. ‘How science makes environmental controversies worse.’ *Environmental Science & Policy* 7.5 (2004), pp. 399-400.

⁴⁵ See, for example, lobbyists trying to open up drilling in Alaska: Alex DeMarban, *Alaska lobbying group quietly plows ahead to open ANWR*, 27 September 2016,

<<https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/article/alaska-lobbying-group-quietly-plows-ahead-open-anwr/2013/06/04/>> [12 May 2019].; Sally Hardin and Jenny Rowland-Shea, *The Most Powerful Arctic Oil Lobby Group You’ve Never Heard Of*, 9 August 2018 <<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2018/08/09/454309/powerful-arctic-oil-lobby-group-youve-never-heard/>> [12 May 2019].

⁴⁶ Luke Campopiano, ‘Is the Arctic a wilderness?: Critiquing Western conceptions of nature in contemporary Arctic rhetoric,’ *Presentation at the School of World Studies Student Research Conference at Virginia Commonwealth University* (Richmond 2018).

The Dark Shadow of Environmentalism: Nature, Nationalism and Modernity in the Third Reich

Fiona Banham

It would be an ironic twist of history indeed if Hitler's cynical disregard for environmental matters should continue to feed our own society's unwillingness to confront its ecological problems.

William H. Rollins.¹

When conceiving of 'environmentalism' in the modern day, one would be forgiven for automatically equating the term with the progressivism and liberalism of the political left. Though defined here as an expression, in both ideology and practice, of concern for the conservation of nature, Slocombe is not alone in highlighting the 'relatively new and poorly defined' nature of 'environmentalism' as a concept.² Indeed, the very idea of – and justification for – environmentalism has evolved over time; frameworks centred around mitigating modern 'environmental' concerns such as climate change cannot be imposed upon a past not yet aware of the existence of such issues. In the same way, aspects of increasingly limited concern in the present day, such as attempts to reverse industrialisation, had a much more ideologically and politically significant role to play in the early-twentieth century. It is precisely the ambiguity of the concept between and within chronological and national boundaries which has left the discourse of 'environmentalism' malleable; in powerful hands, it has been susceptible to the injection of ideologies at both extremes of the political spectrum.

This paper is concerned with the extent to which environmentalism – already imbued with a rich cultural history by the time of ascension of the National Socialist Party to power in Germany in 1933 – was irreversibly manipulated by the extreme right in order to espouse broader nationalist and racist ideologies. It is acknowledged that, on the surface, environmentalism as rooted in the uniquely Germanic, *Völkish* tradition appeared to sit neatly with many elements of National Socialist ideology, as manifested in the proliferation of legislation seemingly advancing the environmentalist (and thus, inevitably, nationalist) cause

¹ William H. Rollins, 'Whose Landscape? Technology, Fascism and Environmentalism on the National Socialist Autobahn', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 85.3 (1995), p. 512.

² D. Scott Slocombe 'Environmentalism: A modern synthesis', *The Environmentalist*, 4.4 (1984), p. 281.

on a scale unprecedented elsewhere in Europe. At the same time, this simplistic depiction of the relationship between the Nazis and the environment is problematised with the scepticism shared by Rollins and countless others, on the basis that Nazi preaching and policy on the issue of the environment cannot be neatly packaged as a coherent, consistent, pro-environmental ideology.³ Did the Nazis even conceive of the idea as a consistent set of stewardship-driven principles, or were they contented simply to cherry-pick at the elements which could be defined in hindsight as espousing ‘environmentalism’, without demonstrating any investment in the more holistic ideology preached by their more devoutly conservationist contemporaries? Beneath the green-fingered publicity stunts, Nazism and environmentalism clashed spectacularly over issues of militarism and modernism, as illustrated here through the demise of environmentalist legislation in the build-up to war and the Janus face of the notorious *Autobahn* project. Thus, it is vital to acknowledge openly that the environmentalist movement was not conceived amidst the student activism of the 1970s; rather, it is followed by a much longer, darker shadow. Yet, contemporary critiques of the environmentalist cause which root themselves in drawing explicit parallels with National Socialism are inherently counter-productive. The irreconcilable discord between culturally ingrained nationalism, expansionism, modernism, and ruralism is much too complex to equate National Socialism and environmentalism unquestioningly; to critique modern conservation practices on the basis of this tenuous connection, so relentlessly popularised during the Third Reich, would only be to contribute ever more stones to the ‘architecturally sensitive’ castle in the sky that is Hitler’s ‘environmentalism’.

On a practical, surface level, it could be argued that the National Socialist programme towards the environment was among the most visible and vocal of its time, thus forging a strong connection between the environmentalist cause and the extreme right. This was predominantly manifested through an abundance of pro-environmental legislation which emerged almost instantaneously in 1933, culminating in the renowned Reich Nature Protection Law of 1935.⁴ Among other things, the new legislation (theoretically) advocated for the protection of natural monuments, the preservation of threatened areas, such as wetlands, and species from urban and industrial developments, the banning of billboards from the countryside, and the establishment

³ Rollins, ‘Whose Landscape? Technology, Fascism and Environmentalism on the National Socialist Autobahn’; see also Frank Uekötter, *The Green and the Brown, A History of Conservation in Nazi Germany* (Cambridge, 2006) and Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, Mark Coic, and Thomas Zeller (eds.), *How Green Were the Nazis?* (Ohio, 2005).

⁴ William T. Markham, *Environmental Organizations in Modern Germany* (New York, 2008), p. 74.

of a National Nature Protection office, providing advice and overseeing environmental management in an unprecedentedly coordinated manner at a regional level.⁵ This would seemingly support Olsen's assertion that, 'although highly ideological, Nazi environmentalism was not merely symbolic'.⁶ Indeed, such policies seemed the answer to the prayers of many environmental campaigners who had been lobbying for these changes in legislation for decades, ever denied by the logistical complexities of democratic administration. For many, the pace and quantity of the measures marked a stark but welcome contrast to the bureaucratic stagnation of the Weimar government.⁷ Though the international environmental conference planned by Schöninchen never materialised in Berlin in 1937, in the face of mounting diplomatic hostilities, Uekötter is perhaps somewhat justified in his speculation that the Nazis may have intrigued their European contemporaries in terms of the surface progressiveness of their legislation on the environment.⁸

Moreover, this prominent Act by no means stood alone, walking hand-in-hand with other measures which, astoundingly, would seem to imply that issues such as environmental and animal welfare were prominent on the National Socialist agenda. Hitler himself was a huge advocate of animal welfare, and 1933 brought in the official outlawing of cruelty to animals.⁹ A significant and forward-thinking attempt to establish and acknowledge the rights of animals as sentient beings, it could perhaps only have been trumped in benevolence by an attempt to recognise all members of his own kind as such. It is also fascinating to note the significant legal restrictions placed upon hunting within the first two years of the regime, when in the present day, hunting is so often fiercely defended by the political right.¹⁰ Here the populist element of Nazism comes to the fore; hunting is the epitome of privilege, and the populist nature of the Nazi appeal therefore does not sit so incongruously with such acts as might appear to the modern observer. The broader relevance of these acts, not just in and of themselves, but also as political and populist statements emphasises the importance of the National Socialist fling with environmentalism not just as a niche strand of the Nazi regime, as it has often been treated by historians, but as part and parcel of a whole package of the National Socialist ideology, which, incongruous and contradictory though it may seem, appeared incomplete without it.

⁵ Markham, *Environmental Organizations*, p. 74.

⁶ Jonathan Olsen, *Nature and Nationalism* (New York, 1999), p. 76.

⁷ Markham, *Environmental Organizations*, p. 72.

⁸ Uekötter, *The Green and the Brown*, p. 209.

⁹ Markham, *Environmental Organizations*, p. 73.

¹⁰ Sarah Knight, Aldert Vrij, Julie Cherryman and Karl Nunkoosing, 'Attitudes towards animal use and the belief in the animal mind', *Anthrozoös*, 17.1 (2015), p. 45.

This would therefore seem to imply the practice of environmentalism to be an inherent and inseparable part of National Socialist policy. Yet such measures shed little light on the extent to which the party invested itself ideologically in the concept, as opposed to simply externally projecting this impression of environmental guardianship.

Numerous scholars have argued that the Nazis were able to frame themselves as defenders of the environment because the discourses which they espoused fitted all too comfortably into contemporary ideas marrying the protection of the environment with the defence of a romanticised national spirit.¹¹ Weiner is far from alone in arguing that the underlying patriotism of the imperial German environmentalists was tainted by aggressive nationalism long before the rise of National Socialism.¹² Implanted in the *Völkish* tradition of *Naturschutz*- of a people ‘rooted’ in the land to which they, and they alone, ‘belonged’ – the concept of the German people as shaped by their unique landscape and environment naturally gave rise to a sense of superiority and a tendency towards othering. It forged a separation between those rightfully ‘German’ by blood and soil, and the ‘rootless’ imposters symbolising an ascending but despised cosmopolitanism. ‘The German people has distinguished itself from earliest times by reason of a specific attachment to its territory’, argued Childs and Brennecke in *The Nazi Primer* – the official pedagogical handbook for the Hitler Youth – in 1937.¹³ The superiority of the German nation could only be secured by the maintenance of territory in the most pristine state of nature. That this idealised state of nature no longer existed (and nor can it ever, while humans walk the earth) necessitated the creation of scapegoats conveniently disassociated from the industrial bigwigs mass-producing armaments for the Nazis behind the idyllic rural scenes. In a much more recent interview, the environmentalist Carl Avery, who lived through the Third Reich, noted that, ‘Hitler saw the Jews as the great enemies of nature. That was the real basis of his murderous anti-Semitism’.¹⁴ By tying the protection of nature to the protection of the nation through this inherently nationalist dimension of environmentalism, the Nazis were able to implicate the Jews in the destruction of this nature through the rootlessness springing from their ongoing quest for a homeland to call their own. In this way,

¹¹ See among them Peter R. Hay, ‘Ecological Values and Western Political Traditions’, in David Pepper, Frank Webster and George Revill (eds.), *Environmentalism, Critical Concepts* (London, 2002), pp. 7-18; Matthew Jefferies, ‘Heimatschutz: Environmental Activism in Wilhelmine Germany’ in Colin Riordan (ed.), *Green Thought in German Culture* (Cardiff, 1997), pp. 42-54; Avner De-Shalit, ‘Ruralism or Environmentalism?’, *Environmental Values*, 5.1 (1996), pp. 47-58.

¹² Douglas R. Weiner (1992), ‘Demythologizing Environmentalism’, *Journal of the History of Biology*, 25.3, p. 388.

¹³ Harwood L. Childs and Fritz Brennecke, *The Nazi Primer* (1937), p. 45.

¹⁴ Carl Avery, cited in Axel Goodbody, *The Culture of German Environmentalism* (New York, 2002), p. 29.

the idea of environmentalism as rootedness in the nation fitted all too conveniently into the broader exclusory politics of the party.

Scrutinise the satisfyingly alliterative phenomenon of *Blut und Boden* ('Blood and Soil') more closely, and the coherent package of National Socialism and environmentalism begins to come apart at the seams. Whilst the respective nationalistic overtones and undertones of national socialism and environmentalism appeared to converge neatly, the Nazis were forced to bluff their way through two extremely prominent inconsistencies. First and foremost, the *Völkish* sense of 'rootedness' inherent in contemporary environmentalist discourses promoted a sense that all peoples belonged to the land in which they were born, and thus left no scope for the aggressive eastwards expansionism so central to Hitler's insatiable thirst for *Lebensraum*.¹⁵ To paper over these trifling inconsistencies whilst maintaining the environmentalist façade, the Nazis set about painting the portrait of a German hero sweeping in to save the lands of the East from environmental abuse and neglect at the hands of the Eastern peoples. 'The murders and cruelties of the Eastern races are engraved, razor-sharp, into the grimaces of their native landscape', wrote Weipking, who was given responsibility over environmental aesthetics in the annexed Eastern territories.¹⁶ So sacred was the bond between blood and soil that only a barbaric people could over-exploit their lands, and Germany felt herself responsible for stepping in to save the natural environment before it was irreversibly damaged.

These dramatic depictions of scarred and barren eastern landscapes were not only exaggerated for dramatic 'othering' effect, but also reveal a fascinating contradiction within the evolution of ideas surrounding wilderness and civilisation. Indeed, the importance of conserving natural resources appeared symptomatic of contemporary trends – at least in authoritarian spheres – with Brain crediting Stalin for protecting forests in the USSR against big business interests, and establishing the *MinlesKhoz* – the Ministry of Forest Management – with enduring impacts.¹⁷ In a similar vein, the Nazis set about the prolific establishment of protected areas in the annexed lands of the East. An astounding 2,600km² was devoted-theoretically, at least- to nature, protecting important ecosystems such as the *Białowieża Puszcza*.¹⁸ Whilst this may have the appearance of yet more evidence placing

¹⁵ Olsen, *Nature and Nationalism*, p. 84.

¹⁶ H.F. Weipking, cited in Weiner, 'Demythologizing Environmentalism', p. 390.

¹⁷ Stephen Brain, "Stalin's Environmentalism", in *The Russian View*, 69.1 (2010), p. 94.

¹⁸ Weiner, 'Demythologizing Environmentalism', p. 390.

environmentalism at the heart of the Nazi agenda, Uekötter is right to lament the blind applause afforded by many contemporary environmental activists to such empty statistics without stopping to ask, 'From where – and from whom – did all of this land come?'.¹⁹ Only by taking note of the small print would they have seen the bigger picture. Paragraph 24 of the Nature Conservation Law stipulated the government's right to confiscate property deemed to be of environmental merit.²⁰ When one considers the ambiguity and potential subjectivity of land of 'environmental merit', such policies appear less as an environmental crusade in defiance of urbanisation than a sugar-coated ploy to dispossess the 'enemies of the Reich' of their land, their livelihoods, their rights and, ultimately, their lives.

The second irreconcilable disparity between the ideological underpinnings of national socialism and environmentalism is fundamentally rooted in the contentious concept of 'modernisation', defined here in the sense of industrialisation, urbanisation and rapid technological advancement. Towards all of these were the Nazis drawn, comprising an essential element of the Four-Year Plan which would secure them victory in the next total war; armament on such a scale would be inconceivable without stepping up industrial productivity to a substantial degree and fully embracing the latest technological developments. And yet, the broad agricultural base of Nazi supporters, drawn in by Darré's promises of achieving self-sufficiency by going 'back to the land' through more sustainable organic farming practices restricted the party's ability to jump with abandon aboard the industrial bandwagon.²¹ Instead, the government threw its all into cultivating a modernist project so aesthetically sensitive that it hoped none would spot the contradiction. Indeed, the superficiality of the Nazis' supposed environmentalism was never more clearly illustrated than through the construction, by 1939, of an impressive 3,700km of high-quality roadways connecting all corners of the Reich. The envy of much of Europe, the renowned *Autobahn* project was without doubt an impressive feat of engineering.²² The project belied every element of Nazi environmentalist discourse, from its rootedness in ruralism to its emphasis upon the precedence of nature and the preservation of fragile habitats, right down to its supposed anti-modernism. And yet the entire scheme was framed in a way as to give the impression of one placing concern for the environment first and

¹⁹ Uekötter, *The Green and the Brown*, p. 209.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

²¹ Olsen, *Nature and Nationalism*, p. 75.

²² Rollins, 'Whose Landscape? Technology, Fascism and Environmentalism on the National Socialist Autobahn', p. 494.

foremost, above the practicality and efficiency of the straight road to encapsulate the sinuosity of the landscape's contours.



The inherent contradictions embedded within Nazi environmentalist discourses are perhaps most explicitly encompassed by the *Autobahn* project.²³

For all its 'sensitivity' to the landscape, however, there was no escaping from the fact that the *Autobahn* was still a high-speed highway representing all that was modern and industrial, inevitably cutting directly across the landscape and enforcing deforestation and the draining of precious wetland habitats in order to enable its construction. Seifert himself, one of the principle landscape engineers ensuring the maintenance of aesthetic appearances, described the *Autobahn* project boastfully as 'the largest invasion of the German landscape that technology has ever dared in such a short space of time'.²⁴ It was not only clear to contemporaries that the new roadways encroached upon the environment on an unprecedented scale; it was seen as a feat of mankind over nature, demonstrating the dominance of humanity in conquering time and distance. This imagined power was wielded for nationalistic purposes

²³ Image Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_pictures/8691249.stm [date accessed: 19/3/19].

²⁴ Seifert, cited in Rollins, 'Whose Landscape? Technology, Fascism and Environmentalism on the National Socialist *Autobahn*', p. 512.

to emphasise the superiority of the technological advancement of the German race, espousing Clark's view that, 'the appeal to imagined timescapes remains one of the key tools of political communication'.²⁵ Rollins also points out that the agendas of the architects of the *Autobahn* project were often very different to those of the Nazis; despite the party's claims to originality, the ideas of Seifert and his disciples concerning the aesthetic integration of industrialised infrastructure into the landscape dated back to the mid-1920s.²⁶ The *Autobahn* project is, therefore, illustrative of the inherent contradiction at the heart of the Nazis' environmentalist project. Herf goes as far as to describe it as a demonstration of 'reactionary modernism', pointing out that the Nazis even viewed the new urban roadways as an improvement upon the landscape from its purely 'natural' state.²⁷ In a direct reversal of romanticised modern conceptions of untamed 'wilderness', here can be distinguished intriguing sentiments of human interference upon the natural worlds as a mark of 'civilisation'.

The dark legacy of over-emphasis upon Nazi environmentalism would be troubling enough were it limited to the confines of history. As with many elements of the regime, however, its shadow looms not only large, but dangerously unaddressed in contemporary environmentalist discourses. Modern critics, almost a century later, have a worrying tendency to resurrect tenuous parallels with Nazi environmentalism, in the context of contemporary debates over present environmental management practices, fundamentally belying the extreme complexity of and contradictions inherent within the Nazis' relationship with the environment around them. This has been perhaps most apparent in debates surrounding the control of non-native or 'alien' plant and animal species. Whilst often controversial and sometimes exaggerated, the control of non-native species with genuinely damaging impacts upon their adopted environments, such as the American mink in the UK, has been thoughtlessly vilified by drawing comparisons between the alleged preferences of the Nazis for specifically 'Germanic' species of plants. Whilst it is true that the likes of Seifert did advocate the idea of *Bodenständig* – that native Germanic climax communities of vegetation were in some way 'superior' on the basis of their rootedness in German soil, such ideology was never explicitly implicated in Nazi environmental policy, and was restricted to individuals often outwith the party mechanism itself. Moreover, to use these shaky parallels to accuse environmentalists

²⁵ Christopher Clark, *Time and Power* (Oxford, 2019), p. 16.

²⁶ Rollins, 'Whose Landscape? Technology, Fascism and Environmentalism on the National Socialist Autobahn', p. 512.

²⁷ Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge, 1984), p. 16.

facilitating the sometimes-unavoidable necessity of controlling non-native species as espousing 'bio-xenophobia' demonstrates a wilful misunderstanding of the true nature of environmentalism in both the present and the past.²⁸ Certainly, Groening and Wolschke-Bulmahn have a tendency to take the connection much too far, arguing as late as 1992 that, 'in some parts of Germany, hostility against certain groups of foreigners is increasing. Perhaps the mania for so-called native plants is just another side of this construction of nature philosophy'.²⁹ Carelessly blending often legitimate concerns for the health of an ecosystem with the highly malicious racial politics of Nazi Germany seriously undermines the complexity of the regime's relationship with nature, which cannot simply be reduced down to soundbites such as 'bio-xenophobia'. A failure to appreciate the ongoing relevance of history is inherently problematic because distorted associations can be used to levy unhelpful and unfounded accusations against the often-innocuous motives of environmentalist cause. Without understanding the ways in which contemporary environmentalism was manipulated and outright rejected, as well as deployed in some respects by the Nazis, dangerous generalised parallels are at risk of haunting a cause which the regime neither wholly invested in, nor even fully comprehended.

It can, therefore, be concluded that the relationship between the Nazis and the environment remains one riddled with complexities. To argue that the Nazis displayed a genuine and benevolent interest in environmental conservation, devoid of ulterior motives, would be to buy into the surface projections of the regime, represented through prolific but often flawed legislative measures that, whilst impressive on paper, were poorly enforced and repeatedly violated by the regime itself. Nor can it be argued that the Nazis remained entirely indifferent towards issues of environmentalism; the fundamental and long-standing connection between *Blut und Boden* coined by Darré meant that the party recognised its patriotic duty to 'protect' the nature existing symbiotically with the perceived health of the nation. And yet, the increasing urgency of preparations for war exposed the hypocrisy of the 'environmentalist' policies to an increasing extent, which were shunned in favour of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in the name of the Nationalist Socialist concept of 'progress'. That Darré had become 'a voice in the wilderness' by 1942 highlights the fact that his ambitions towards sustainable agriculture had become a hindrance to the environmentally insensitive mass

²⁸ Daniel Simberloff, 'Confronting introduced species: a form of xenophobia?', *Biological Invasions*, 5.3 (2003), p. 183.

²⁹ Gert Groening and Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn 'Some Notes on the Mania for Native Plants in Germany', *Landscape Journal*, 11.2 (1992), p. 118.

production which the ‘anti-modernist’ regime loved to hate, and yet became entirely dependent upon.³⁰

Whilst the parallels between environmentalism and the Nazi regime should never be over-exaggerated or excessively simplified, it is vital for the modern environmental movement to acknowledge the existence of these chains linking back to the fascist tendencies of the early-twentieth century. Riordan is justified in his argument that, ‘responsible stewardship necessitates historical awareness’.³¹ To ignore history, however unsavoury its components, would be for the modern environmentalist movement to open itself up to prejudice and misunderstanding on the basis of oversimplifying the past; the thought of Hitler’s relative indifference to environmental matters serving as a bitter and enduring impediment to modern progress within issues surrounding environmental management is that very same ‘ironic twist of history’ previously alluded to by Rollins.³² To this end, the need for the acceptance of an interdisciplinary approach, recognising the ways in which History, Geography, and Ecology can complement one another to the mutual benefit of each, has never been more pressing.

³⁰ Markham, *Environmental Organizations in Modern Germany*, p. 75.

³¹ Colin Riordan, ‘Green Ideas in Germany: A Historical Survey’ in Colin Riordan (ed.), *Green Thought in German Culture* (Cardiff, 1997), p. 33.

³² Rollins ‘Whose Landscape? Technology, Fascism and Environmentalism on the National Socialist Autobahn’, p. 512.



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